QuickSearch:   Number of matching entries: 0.

Search Settings

    AuthorTitleYearJournal/ProceedingsReftypeDOI/URL
    Ackerman, F. Priceless Benefits, Costly Mistakes: What's Wrong With Cost-Benefit Analysis? 2005 Post-Autistic Economics Review(25)  article  
    Review: ``Ill-founded economic theories provide a seemingly scientic rationale for doing the wrong thing''
    BibTeX:
    @article{ackerman05,
      author = {Frank Ackerman},
      title = {Priceless Benefits, Costly Mistakes: What's Wrong With Cost-Benefit Analysis?},
      journal = {Post-Autistic Economics Review},
      year = {2005},
      number = {25}
    }
    
    Baskoy, T. Thorstein Veblen's Theory of Business Competition 2003 Journal of Economic Issues
    Vol. 37(4), pp. 1121-1137 
    article  
    Review: ``Veblen, like Marx and many theorists beofre the neoclassical synthesis, did not make a split between his micro and macro theories, but he attempted to provide us with a holistic and dynamic theory" (1135)
    BibTeX:
    @article{bakoy03,
      author = {Tuna Baskoy},
      title = {Thorstein Veblen's Theory of Business Competition},
      journal = {Journal of Economic Issues},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {37},
      number = {4},
      pages = {1121-1137}
    }
    
    Bergh, J. d. & Growdy, J. The Microfoundations of Macroeconomics: an Evolutionary Perspective 2003 Cambridge Journal of Economics
    Vol. 27, pp. 65-84 
    article  
    Review: Sum: The micro-macro debate is more developed in biology than in economics. Both micro and macro processes drive economic change and that macroeconomic change cannot be explained by micro-level optimising alone. The opposition of reductionism and holism is of little use and, in its place, a hierarchical approach is proposed. This allows for both upward and downward causation and interaction between levels.

    The micro-macro distinction has been a hot issue among social sciences (economics and sociology) and hard sciences (biology). In this papers authors attempt to applied recent development in biology regarding the debate to economics.Biologists argue that there are two distinctive but interactive evolutions: macro-evolutions and micro-evolution. They drive the organism to develop and progress. Conventional wisdom adopted by mainstream economics rests mainly upon social Darwinism a la Herbert Spencer. Walrasian microfoundations based upon methodological individualism is the logical and natural consequence of such a micro-evolutionary view (of efficiency), and is limited and misguided, according to authors. Rationality, equilibrium, and aggregation are logical consequence and only if strict methodological individualism is assumed. Holism is on the wrong track, as is M.individualism. Thus authors argue that economists could borrow biological conceptions: Macro-evolution as hierarchical causation, punctuated equilibrium. It is good to see their extensive review on literature. But their arguments should be criticized in several regards. First, they suggests the game theoretic model as a realistic way of approach to micro-macro dichotomy. I, however, doubt its relevancy from a real 'Realist' perspective. Those game theoretic models (in particular, Gintis and Bowls) with more realistic assumptions may lead to more realistic results. But the model in the first place is less realistic than historical narratives and reasoning. This is because the game model has limited capacity to describe and incorporate the real world. More often than not they do not consider the openness and uncertainty. The game model is in its nature not realistic. The same sort of criticism goes to analytical Marxism. The existence of macro-evolution, if any, leads to the two ways of foundations: microfoundations and macrofoundations. But from my perspective there are only microfoundations, a proper one, which generates structural elaboration and transformation. It is agents not structures which makes the system move. In the paper authors still follow the orthodox distinction of micro-macro which based upon a quantitative standard. I propose that micro-macro should be distinguished from a qualitative standard (as Archer did) because of emergent properties.

    BibTeX:
    @article{bergh03,
      author = {Bergh, J.C.J.M.van den and J.M. Growdy},
      title = {The Microfoundations of Macroeconomics: an Evolutionary Perspective},
      journal = {Cambridge Journal of Economics},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {27},
      pages = {65-84}
    }
    
    Berle, A.A. & Means, G.C. The Modern Corporation and Private Property 1968   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{berle-means:32,
      author = {Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means},
      title = {The Modern Corporation and Private Property},
      publisher = {Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.},
      year = {1968},
      edition = {Revised},
      note = {Originally published in 1932.}
    }
    
    Blair, J.M. Economic Concentration: Structure, Behavior and Pulic Policy 1972   book  
    Review: [xiii] It was the power of the large corporations to raise prices in the face of low and falling demand that set the stage for direct governmental intervention in the pricing-making process.

    [xiv] a wrong theory can cause far more harm than no theory at all.

    BibTeX:
    @book{blair:72,
      author = {John M. Blair},
      title = {Economic Concentration: Structure, Behavior and Pulic Policy},
      publisher = {Harcourt Brace Javanovich},
      year = {1972}
    }
    
    Boggio, L. On the stability of production prices 1985 Metroeconomica
    Vol. 37(3), pp. 241-267 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{boggio:85,
      author = {Luciano Boggio},
      title = {On the stability of production prices},
      journal = {Metroeconomica},
      year = {1985},
      volume = {37},
      number = {3},
      pages = {241-267}
    }
    
    Bortis, H. Structure and change within the circular theory of production 1990 The Economic Theory of Structure and Change, pp. 64-92  incollection  
    BibTeX:
    @incollection{bortis:90,
      author = {Heinrich Bortis},
      title = {Structure and change within the circular theory of production},
      booktitle = {The Economic Theory of Structure and Change},
      publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
      year = {1990},
      pages = {64-92}
    }
    
    Bortis, H. From Post Keynesian to Classical-Keynesian Political Economy: Luigi Pasinetti and the Gap between Keynes and Sraffa 2006   conference  
    BibTeX:
    @conference{bortis06,
      author = {Bortis, Heinrich},
      title = {From Post Keynesian to Classical-Keynesian Political Economy: Luigi Pasinetti and the Gap between Keynes and Sraffa},
      year = {2006}
    }
    
    Bortis, H. Marshall, the Keynesian revolution and Sraffa's significance 2003 Journal of Economic Studies
    Vol. 31(1), pp. 77-97 
    article  
    Review: A theory is pure in the Sraffian sense that it is ``timeless, no leads or lags enter the picture. Applied theory, however, is about historical realizations of abstract causal forces'' (Bortis 2003, 94).
    BibTeX:
    @article{bortis:03,
      author = {Heinrich Bortis},
      title = {Marshall, the Keynesian revolution and Sraffa's significance},
      journal = {Journal of Economic Studies},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {31},
      number = {1},
      pages = {77-97}
    }
    
    Bortis, H. Institutions, Behaviour and Economic Theory 1997   book  
    Review: synthesis of Classical political economy and Keynesian macro
    BibTeX:
    @book{bortis97,
      author = {Bortis, Heinrich.},
      title = {Institutions, Behaviour and Economic Theory},
      publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
      year = {1997}
    }
    
    Brette, O. & Mehier, C. Veblen's evolutionary economics revisited through the micro-meso-macro framework: the stakes for the analysis of clusters of innovation 2005   conference  
    Review: Jo's note: Authors develop the micro-meso-macro framework initiated by Dopfer et al (2004) with incorporating Veblenian evolutionary standpoints. They argue that rules can be interpreted as habits in Veblen's term. The evolutions (or meso-trajectory) hence is understood as the origination (adoption)-diffusion (adaptation)-retention. In other words, "economic evolution is a growth of knowledge process." Knowledge here is used, like Veblen, as more than just ideas. Novel knowledge originated by a individual spread over collective agents and form a cluster innovation which ignite diffusion, elaboration, and refinement of the system (or possibly, accumulation of such knowledge could generate transformation). And more importantly authors maintain Veblenian conceptions of path-dependence and lock-in effect with contrast to neoclassical notion of equilibrium. Authors apply such evolutionary process (meso-trajectory) in the context of innovation in and out of business enterprise (market and industry). This application could be further elaborated in a realist theory of firm which I am pursuing. The interaction/interdependence between agency and social structure are presented little bit. This paper and Dopfer et al (2004) can be argued in my thesis. "micro relates to individual habits, meso institutions and "institutional logics" and macro to the "cultural complex" of society" (p. 21)
    BibTeX:
    @conference{brette05,
      author = {Brette, Olivier. and Caroline Mehier},
      title = {Veblen's evolutionary economics revisited through the micro-meso-macro framework: the stakes for the analysis of clusters of innovation},
      year = {2005}
    }
    
    Canale, R.R. Microfoundations of macroeconomics: Post-Keynesian contributions on the theory of the firm 2003   techreport  
    BibTeX:
    @techreport{canale03,
      author = {Rosaria Rita Canale},
      title = {Microfoundations of macroeconomics: Post-Keynesian contributions on the theory of the firm},
      year = {2003}
    }
    
    Carter, M.R. A Wisconsin Institutionalist Perspective on Microeconomic Theory of Institutions: The Insufficiency of Pareto Efficiency 1985 Journal of Economic Issues
    Vol. XIX(3), pp. 797-813 
    article  
    Review: The converse of the Coase's theorem: ``in the presence of transaction cots, property rights and institutional arrangements do affect resource allocation'' (798). ``The great irony of general equilibrium theory is that it relies on the centralized device of the fictive auctioneer to explain equilibrium in a decentralized system of markets" (799) ``property rights affect whose costs and benefits enter the calculations that determine resource allocation in a non-Walrasian world" (799) John R. Commons's yellow dog contracts: ``contracts signed by employees in which they promise not to join a union as a condition of employment" (801). ``Yellow dog contracts exist because of economic coercion created by the institutional structure of the capitalist economy, and they persist because of a class-based legal system" (804) The neoclassical interpretation of yellow dog contracgs would be like this: ``The fact that individuals signed yellow dog contracts without non-economic coercion indicates that the utility value of the union to the worker was less than the cost of the union to the firm. Othewise, workers would have counteroffered a contract permitting unionziation but with a wage sufficiently low to offset the cost of unionization to the firm. Moreover, assuming that appropriate markets exist and function, it would not matter whether workers have a right to unionize or firms have a right to be free of unions'' (807) Commons takes the Institutional point of view to analyze yellow dog contracts: ``What determines the reservation utility $U$? What evolution of ownership over means of production explains the given alternative opportunities that are the datum of the microtheoretic approach? From this point of view, the Pareto efficiency of the exchange implicit in an institutional arrangement does not suffice to explain the institution. The evolution of institutional rules determines bargaining power and alternative opportunity is the centerpiece of Commons's institutional economic analysis" (808)
    BibTeX:
    @article{carter85,
      author = {Michael R. Carter},
      title = {A Wisconsin Institutionalist Perspective on Microeconomic Theory of Institutions: The Insufficiency of Pareto Efficiency},
      journal = {Journal of Economic Issues},
      year = {1985},
      volume = {XIX},
      number = {3},
      pages = {797-813}
    }
    
    Chamberlin, E.H. The Theory of Monopolistic Competition: A Reorientation of the Theory of Value 1933   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{chamberlin33,
      author = {Edward H. Chamberlin},
      title = {The Theory of Monopolistic Competition: A Reorientation of the Theory of Value},
      publisher = {Harvard University Press},
      year = {1933}
    }
    
    Chandler, A.D. The Visible Hand 1977   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{chandler:77,
      author = {Alfred D. Chandler},
      title = {The Visible Hand},
      publisher = {Harvard University Press},
      year = {1977}
    }
    
    Chester, L. Actually Existing Markets: The case of Neoliberal Australia 2010 Journal of Economics Issues
    Vol. 44(2), pp. 313-323 
    article  
    Review: [314] Australia's mode of régulation and institutional constitutes: wage-labor's relationship with capital, monetary and credit relationship, the competitive realtions between firms, the nature of international relationships and arrangements, and the form of state intervention including economic policy.

    [315] The progressive and cumulative impact of these insttituional changes, driven by interventions by the state at both macro and micro levels, are paradoxical given the prevailing economic and political ideology of neoliberalism that promotes deregulation, much less intervention by the state, and the triumph of ``free'' markets. The disjuncture between neoliberalism's free market rhetoric and actual outcome is immediately evident from the comparison shown in Table 1.

    [318] Five markets (formerly directly controlled by the state) are surveyed: electricity, water, housing for low-income Australians, Employment services for the unemployed, and carbon trading.

    12 implications found from this study. see Table 2.

    BibTeX:
    @article{chester:10,
      author = {Lynne Chester},
      title = {Actually Existing Markets: The case of Neoliberal Australia},
      journal = {Journal of Economics Issues},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {44},
      number = {2},
      pages = {313-323}
    }
    
    Clifton, J.A. Competitive Market Process 1987 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, pp. 553-556  incollection  
    Review: deregulation and free markets. evidences of static and dynamic inefficiencies in industry.

    Classical notion of competition: competition is evident as a systematic and general force in the empirically obseved fact atht accounting rates of return across firms and industries tend toward uniformity over time. ``interdependent, dynamic raivalies are what lead to the tendency toward uniformity in returns across the price system''.

    Neoclassical perfect comeptition: it requires atomism and of independent agents under static premises of maximization. ``It seems pointless to to try to reconstitute the general theory of competitive value by still more a priori game theorizing which only adds to the false perception of indeterminacy and lack of systematic generality in `price behaviour' under contemporary market conditions'' (553)

    BibTeX:
    @incollection{clifton87,
      author = {J. A. Clifton},
      title = {Competitive Market Process},
      booktitle = {The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics},
      publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
      year = {1987},
      pages = {553-556}
    }
    
    Cornehls, J.V. Veblen's Theory of Finance Capitalism and Contemporary Corporate America 2004 Journal of Economic Issues
    Vol. 38(1), pp. 29-57 
    article  
    Review: ``The modern conservative is engaged in one of man's oldest exercises in moral philosophy; that is, the search for a superior moral justification for selfishness" -- John Kenneth Galbraith.

    Veblen's theory financial capitalism -- or, monetary production economy, in a sense: The Theory of Business Enterprise (1904) and ``On the Nature of Capital I & II".

    Capital is identified as `real (tangible) capital' and `(pecuniary) assets' (money capital). 32.

    ``Veblen faulted the neoclassical economists' treatment of capital because it confused the concept of capital as material goods--machinery and equipment--with the modern business concept of capital as pecuniary assets" (Raines and Leathers 1996, ``VeblenianStock Markets and the Efficient Market Hypothesis, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Fall: 138; 32)

    The effect of standardization of work on workers:\br>``[T]he task specialization of modern industry (welding the same spot on each passing vehicle in a moving assembly line for eight hours daily) has a deadening and coarsening effect on workers. The monotony o performing the same simple task, over and over for 25 years, alienates workers from their employment, depriving them of an essential ingredient of life: meaningful, fulfilling work" (33).

    From Veblen (1969:354)\br>``The ownership of the material equipment gives the owner not only the right of use of the community's immaterial equipment but also the right of abuse and of neglect of inhibition"

    ``These modern forms of knowledge ownership become ``assets" (i.e., intellectual capital) to be capitalized and sold for pecuniary gain or to be used as collateral for credit extension" (33)

    Contradiction between business and industry (or community as whole)--`industrial sabotage' (Veblen 1921, The Engineers and the Price System):\br>``It frequently is in pecuniary interests of the owners of material assets (capital) to ``curtail or retard the process of industry, -`restraint of trade'" (Veblen 1969: 354; 33). The reason for this restraint of trade or production is to enhance the monetary gain of the owner(s) of capital, that is, income from investment not in the service of the community or any subset of the community, other than the owners (managers) of capital themselves. (33)

    From Veblen (1969:354)\br>``Except for the exigencies of investment, i.e., exigencies of pecuniary gain to the investor, phenomena of this character would have no place in the industrial system. They invariably come of the endeavors of business men to secure a pecuniary gain or to avoid a pecuniary loss. More frequently, perhaps, manoeuvers of inhibition--advised idleness of plant--in industry aim to effect a saving or avoid a waste than to procure an increase of gain; but the saving to be effected and the waste to be avoided are always pecuniary saving to the owner and pecuniary waste in the matter of ownership, not a saving of goods to the community or a prevention of wasteful consumption or wasteful expenditure of effort and resources on the part of the community".

    ``Veblen observed that societies almost universally ascribe to some form of social class system, in which one group is accorded deferential privileges vis-á-vis other groups" (see Veblen 1969:360-361).

    Veblen's goodwill:\p>my argument: Big business has a greater 'good will' (e.g., brand identification, trade mark, arm's length relationship with financial institutions) which makes easier financing.
    -- Eichner's argument

    Veblen Vs. NC:\br>``In The Theory of Business Enterprise, Veblen undertook his most thorough analysis of the conduct of the business corporation. His analysis in sharp contrast to the genial, socially productive behavior of the capitalist envisioned by neoclassical economci theory. Neoclassical economics depicted business people, under the guidance of a benigh market, producing to consumers. In Veblen's system this same group of business people would as soon sabotage production as enhance it, in order to obtain a financial gain."(34)

    ``Veblen's most important contribution to an alternate understanding of the workings of modern capitalism was the juxtaposition of the ordinary, matter-of-fact nature of the machine process (technical know-how and capital equipment) with the prevalent business institutions and their conduct. Whereas neoclassical economics assumed businessmen sought always to increase production and improve efficiency, Veblen recognized that the predatory nature of the enterprise frequently was used to disturb this process for the sake of financial gain. (34) ``The end is pecuniary gain, the means is disturbance of the industrial system" (Veblen 1904: 20).

    it seems that Veblen has the notion of monetary neutrality at the aggregate level. \br>``[I]t may be said that, taken in the aggregate, the funds so added to business capital represent no material capital or ``production goods." They are business capital only; they sell the volume of business, as counted in terms of price, etc., but they do not directly swell the volume of industry." (Veblen 1904: 52)

    Veblen's theory of business cycle in the context of monetary production economy (credit economy) sounds like Minsky's financial instability hypothesis. (see 36 of this article).

    ``...financial empires are created at the expense of real production of valuable goods and services and sometimes the survival of the corporation itself" (39).

    BibTeX:
    @article{cornehls04,
      author = {Cornehls, James V.},
      title = {Veblen's Theory of Finance Capitalism and Contemporary Corporate America},
      journal = {Journal of Economic Issues},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {38},
      number = {1},
      pages = {29-57}
    }
    
    Coutts, K., G.W. & Nordhaus, W. Industrial Pricing in the United Kingdom 1978   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{coutts78,
      author = {Coutts, K., Godley, W., and Nordhaus, W.},
      title = {Industrial Pricing in the United Kingdom},
      publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
      year = {1978}
    }
    
    Cyert, R. & March, J. A Behavioral Theory of The Firm 1964   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{cyert64,
      author = {R.M. Cyert and J.G. March},
      title = {A Behavioral Theory of The Firm},
      publisher = {Prentice-Hall, Inc.},
      year = {1964}
    }
    
    Dallery, T. Post-Keynesian Theories of the Firm under Financialization 2009 Review of Radical Political Economics
    Vol. 41(4), pp. 492-515 
    article  
    Review: Pk theory of the firm in line with Wood (1975), Galbraith, Lavoie (1992), Stockhammer (2004), and Crotty. No reference to Eichner, Lee

    Institutional trasition from Mangerial capitalism (managerial theory of the firm) to shareholder capitalism along with financialization: a need for a new theory of the firm.

    Managerial theory of the firm:
    Following Lavoie and Kalecki: external financing is proportional to internal financing. The profit margin is a key determinant of the pricing policy of the firm (Wood) -- different pricing principles are not identified.

    Stockhammer (2004): a firm utility function; a firm as a sum of owners and shareholder who have differnt goals -- that is, max growth rate vs max profit rate. Maximization -- problematic.
    "The microeconomic theory arises in order to fit macroeconomic trend"

    Thesis 1: Financialization increases devidend payments and greater indebtedness. Divdend/profits -- 30% (1980, France) to 80% (late 1990s); 40% (1960-80, US) to 70% (1982-2003). Total payments to financila markets as a percentage of cash flows increased.

    Thesis 2: Financialization as a constraint for managers (whose goal both max growth rate and profit rates)

    Thesis 3: Increasing risk of default -- managers tend to over-utilize corporate capacity in order to increase profit rates. Over-utiliztion increases the risk of defualt when market demand surges.

    Real fragility and financial fragility --- fragility is interchangeable with risks and instability in the paper.

    Conclusion: "it is possible to introduce financialization within the framework of the post-Keynesian theory of the firm"..."The microeconomic implications of finacialization for the theory of the firm need to be integrated with the macroeconomci story of financialization. As opposed to mainstream view of profits as the necessary and sufficient condition providing a maximization of social well-being, here I suggest that profits may be too high for the health of an economy because of the sacrifices implied by such profits (sluggish accumulation, depressed wages, rising indebtedness, and financial fragility)"

    Thesis 4: excessie profit rates lead to sluggish accumulation, depressed wages, rising indebtedness, and financial fragility.

    BibTeX:
    @article{dallery09,
      author = {Thomas Dallery},
      title = {Post-Keynesian Theories of the Firm under Financialization},
      journal = {Review of Radical Political Economics},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {41},
      number = {4},
      pages = {492-515}
    }
    
    Davies, J.E. & Lee, F.S. A Post Keynesian Appraisal of the Contestability Criterion 1988 Journal of Post Keynesian Economics
    Vol. 11(1), pp. 3-25 
    article  
    Review: ``the post Keynesian theory [of the firm] is not a single body of doctrine but instead embraces several distinct themes grown from different roots. One is centered on the work of Kalecki (1968) and Steindl (1945), who emphasize the consequence of coporate size; another on the work of Gardiner Means, which emphasizes the administered pricing concept (Lee, 1986); and a third on the works of Hall and HItch (1939) and Andrews (1949; 1951; 1964)'' (12)

    ``Common to most of these [PK] writers is the same basic perspective on the nature of the firm, its market, and pricing practices developed initially by Andrews'' (12)

    ``It [the role of time in the PK perspective] is the dimension of transformation...no short or long period, only historical time, since any action taken at a point in time will have implications over time'' (13-14)

    ``the organic conception of the firm in Post Keynesian theory teaches that prices should not be regatded primarily as the resultant of some mechanical calculation of the maximal profit realizable under current conditions of demand and cost. Instead firms set prices using the full-cost principle, with the size of the gross costing margin (added to direct costs to give prices) being determined so as to generate the revenue nedded to finance investment in plant and equipment, to create new goods and marekts, and generally to implement their chosen strategies for the realization of their long-term objectives of suvival and growth. Thus the full cost prices of post Keynesian theory are conceptually non-equilibrium prices; rather they are prices which consciously promote continual change in the economy (Robinson 1961)'' (20)

    BibTeX:
    @article{davies-lee88,
      author = {John E. Davies and Frederic S. Lee},
      title = {A Post Keynesian Appraisal of the Contestability Criterion},
      journal = {Journal of Post Keynesian Economics},
      year = {1988},
      volume = {11},
      number = {1},
      pages = {3-25}
    }
    
    Davis, J.B. The theory of individual in economics: identify and value 2003   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{davis03,
      author = {John B. Davis},
      title = {The theory of individual in economics: identify and value},
      publisher = {Routledge},
      year = {2003}
    }
    
    Dopfer, K. The economic agent as rule maker and rule user: Homo Sapiens Oeconomicus 2004 Journal of Evolutionary Economics
    Vol. 14(2), pp. 177-195 
    article  
    Abstract: The paper discusses the micro foundations of evolutionary economics, introducing a unified concept of the economic agent as a rule maker and rule user. Based on recent findings of the neuronal, cognitive and behavioral sciences, Homo Sapiens Oeconomicus emerges as an alternative to Homo Oeconomicus. A taxonomy of rules distinguishing between cognitive, behavioral and blueprint rules and a set of theoretical propositions related to the structure and evolution of those rules are suggested.
    BibTeX:
    @article{dopfer04,
      author = {Kurt Dopfer},
      title = {The economic agent as rule maker and rule user: Homo Sapiens Oeconomicus},
      journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {14},
      number = {2},
      pages = {177-195}
    }
    
    Dopfer, K., Foster, J. & Potts, J. Micro-meso-macro 2004 Journal of Evolutionary Economics
    Vol. 14(3), pp. 263-279 
    article  
    Review: Evolutionary realism, emergentism, micro-macro synthesis through meso The paper provide an alternative way of looking at economic structure from a evolutionary viewoints: in part, Schumpeterian and also Veblenian. The main theme is that the economic structure cannot be aggregated or disaggregated to macro and micro. Such method is done by neoclassical economists and hence there is no evolution, change, and process. On the contrary, the evolutionary standpoint is a better perspective to theorize, analyize socio-economic evolution which is by way of adoptation, adaptation, and maintenance of emerging ideas (knowledge or habits of thoughts). The evolution is thus a matter of a change in meso-relations which is connected to micro- and macro-relations/structures. Certainly, it is good point to make that evolutionary economics is not just micro but also macro analysis. It is micro-meso-macro framework. This is because of basically emergent properties generated by agents. The notion of rule in this paper can be extended to the notions of institution and culture. In fact, some notions used here are not very clear. And for another the role of agency in the process of evolution is not emphasized. So it seems that evolutions is natural phenomenon, but it is not. (Jo, 11/29/2005)
    BibTeX:
    @article{dopferetal04,
      author = {Dopfer, Kurt. and John Foster and Jason Potts},
      title = {Micro-meso-macro},
      journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {14},
      number = {3},
      pages = {263-279}
    }
    
    Dopfer, K. & Potts, J. The General Theory of Economic Evolution 2008   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{dopferpotts08,
      author = {Kurt Dopfer and Jason Potts},
      title = {The General Theory of Economic Evolution},
      publisher = {Routledge},
      year = {2008}
    }
    
    Dow, S.C. Microfoundations: A Diversity of Treatments 1985a Eastern Economic Journal
    Vol. XI(4), pp. 342-360 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{dow85a,
      author = {Dow, Sheila C.},
      title = {Microfoundations: A Diversity of Treatments},
      journal = {Eastern Economic Journal},
      year = {1985a},
      volume = {XI},
      number = {4},
      pages = {342-360}
    }
    
    Downward, P. Prices 2009 Handbook of Economics and Ethics, pp. 399-406  incollection  
    BibTeX:
    @incollection{downward:09,
      author = {Paul Downward},
      title = {Prices},
      booktitle = {Handbook of Economics and Ethics},
      publisher = {Edward Elgar},
      year = {2009},
      pages = {399-406}
    }
    
    Downward, P.M. Price Stickiness: A Post Keynesian Microeconomic Perspective 2001 Eastern Economic Journal
    Vol. 27, pp. 165-? 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{downward01,
      author = {Paul M. Downward},
      title = {Price Stickiness: A Post Keynesian Microeconomic Perspective},
      journal = {Eastern Economic Journal},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {27},
      pages = {165-?}
    }
    
    Downward, P.M. A Realist Appraisal of Post Keynesian Pricing Theory 2000 Cambridge Journal of Economics
    Vol. 24, pp. 211-224 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{downward00,
      author = {Downward, Paul M.},
      title = {A Realist Appraisal of Post Keynesian Pricing Theory},
      journal = {Cambridge Journal of Economics},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {24},
      pages = {211-224}
    }
    
    Downward, P.M. Pricing Theory in Post Keynesian Economics 1999   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{downward99,
      author = {Downward, Paul M.},
      title = {Pricing Theory in Post Keynesian Economics},
      publisher = {Edward Elgar},
      year = {1999}
    }
    
    Downward, P.M. & Lee, F.S. Post Keynesian Price Theory: Critical but Constructive Dialogue 2004   conference  
    Review: Critiques of Shapiro and Sawyer (2003, JPKE) SS (2003): 1. denying legitimacy of price beyond pricing. 2. ignoring normal cost pricing, emphasizing mark-up pricing (Kalecki and Eichner). 3. enhancing realism by introducing strategic behavior of the firm Critiques: 1. reducing price theory to pricing theory - so improverishing Pk theory 2. empirical evidence beyond Kalecki and Eichner 3. difficulty of integrating Kalecki and Eichner since they stand in different footing 4. ambiguity in their concepts of prices and pricing 5. implicit adherence to marginalism 6. ambiguity of the concept of strategy
    BibTeX:
    @conference{downwardlee04,
      author = {Paul M. Downward and Frederic S. Lee},
      title = {Post Keynesian Price Theory: Critical but Constructive Dialogue},
      year = {2004}
    }
    
    Downward, P.M. & Lee, F.S. Post Keynesian Pricing Theory ``Reconsidered"? A Criticial Review of Asking About Prices 2001 Journal of Post Keynesian Economics
    Vol. 23(3), pp. 465-483 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{downwardlee01,
      author = {Paul M. Downward and Frederic S. Lee},
      title = {Post Keynesian Pricing Theory ``Reconsidered"? A Criticial Review of Asking About Prices},
      journal = {Journal of Post Keynesian Economics},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {23},
      number = {3},
      pages = {465-483}
    }
    
    Drakopoulos, S.A. Hierarchical Choice in Economics 1994 Journal of Economic Surveys
    Vol. 8(2), pp. 133-153 
    article  
    Review: Genesis of hierarchical choice: Plato in Republic.

    Social choice and social welfare function.
    The Rawlsian social welfare function: ``The incorporation of the welfare of the worst off individual in society as the absolute minimum attaches a hierarchical flavour to this kind of social welfare function.'' (147)

    Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function:

    W = min(u^1(x_1), u^m(x^m))

    BibTeX:
    @article{drakopoulos94,
      author = {S. A. Drakopoulos},
      title = {Hierarchical Choice in Economics},
      journal = {Journal of Economic Surveys},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {8},
      number = {2},
      pages = {133-153}
    }
    
    Dunn, S.P. A Post Keynesian Approach to the Theory of the Firm 2002 Post Keynesian Economics, Microeconmics and the Theory of the Firm  incollection  
    Review: Ch. 11 The Theory of the Firm as a contribution to Post Keynesianism

    Integration of monetary monetary and power considerations into the study of governance structures--firms

    Firm as a means of co-ordinating production from one centre of strategic decision making in an uncertain (nonergodic) enviornment

    Uncertainty--money--Keynes (FK)--mainly Davidson
    Distribution--power--Galbraith & Kaleckian-Marxian tradition

    In sum, Dunn is attempting to integrate the essence of Post Keynesian theory--uncertainty and money--and partial institutional theory (in the sense that he takes dynamic approach which presumes uncertainty, historical time, and evolution). What he means by Post Keynesian theory of the firm is the organization theory of the firm which necessarily requires strategic behaviors--pricing and investment in particular. Prior to Dunn, he argues that ``Post Keynesians have opened up the orthodox `black box' approach to organisation relatively closed. In a nutshell, Post Keynesian theorizing on the internal organsation of the firm is ad-hoc at best and non-existent generally. However his claim also holds to his version of the theory of the firm. Dunn is at most arguing the proper direction of the Post Keynesian theory of the firm, but he is not showing what that is. Black box is still unopened.

    His big picture of the potential Post Keynesian theory of the business enterprise is on the right track. However the theory lacks of some important Post Keynesian and institutionalist contributions to the theory: Alfred Eichner. This is the starting point of my realist theory of business enterprise.

    BibTeX:
    @incollection{dunn02,
      author = {Dunn, Stephen P.},
      title = {A Post Keynesian Approach to the Theory of the Firm},
      booktitle = {Post Keynesian Economics, Microeconmics and the Theory of the Firm},
      publisher = {Edward Elgar},
      year = {2002}
    }
    
    Dunn, S.P. An Investigation into a Post Keynesian contribution to the Theory of the Firm 2001 School: University of Leeds  phdthesis  
    Review: In sum, Dunn is attempting to integtrate the essense of Post Keynesian theory--uncertainty and money--and partial institutional theory (in the sense that he takes dynamic approach which presumes uncertainty, historical time, and evolution). What he means by Post Keynesian theory of the firm is the organization theory of the firm which necessarily requires strategic behaviors--pricing and investment in particular. Prior to Dunn, he argues that ``Post Keynesians have opened up the orthodox `black box' approach to organisation relatively closed. In a nutshell, Post Keynesian theorizing on the internal organsation of the firm is ad-hoc at best and non-existent generally. However his claim also holds to his version of the theory of the firm. Dunn is at most arguing the proper direction of the Post Keynesian theory of the firm, but he is not showing what that is. Black box is still unopened. His big picture of the potential Post Keynesian theory of the business enterprise is on the right track. However the theory lacks of some important Post Keynesian and institutionalist contributions to the theory: Alfred Eichner. This is the starting point of my realist theory of business enterprise.
    BibTeX:
    @phdthesis{dunn01,
      author = {Dunn, Stephen P.},
      title = {An Investigation into a Post Keynesian contribution to the Theory of the Firm},
      school = {University of Leeds},
      year = {2001}
    }
    
    Eichner, A.S. The Macrodynamics of Advanced Market Economies 1987   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{eichner87,
      author = {Alfred S. Eichner},
      title = {The Macrodynamics of Advanced Market Economies},
      publisher = {M.E. Sharpe},
      year = {1987}
    }
    
    Eichner, A.S. Towards an Empirically Valid Economics 1985 Eastern Economic Journal
    Vol. XI(4), pp. 437-449 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{eichner85,
      author = {Eichner, Alfred S.},
      title = {Towards an Empirically Valid Economics},
      journal = {Eastern Economic Journal},
      year = {1985},
      volume = {XI},
      number = {4},
      pages = {437-449}
    }
    
    Eichner, A.S. Why Economics is not Yet a Science 1983   book  
    Review: Eichner 1983 Why economics is not yet a science ``Post-Keynesian theory is intended to provide a causal explanation of how a real economic system, with advanced institutions, operates. It is therefore set in historical time, with an immutable past and an unknowable future, both of which play a critical role in determining the present'' (Eichner 1983, 218)

    ``Indeed, to the extent that the orthodox theory amounts to little more than the specification of the conditions that must be met if resources are to be optimally allocated under various hypothetical states, it makes no pretense of being an explanatory science in the tradition of physics, chemistry, and biology.'' (218)

    Consequences of the reinterpretation of economics by means of mathematical methods ``There is first the continued adherence to a non-scientific epistemology which the mathematicization of economic has encouraged. Economists as a group have adopted the view that formal, or mathematical, proofs are entirely sufficient to establish the validity of a theory rather than being just necessary'' (229-230).

    Second consequence is the sharp distinction between theorists and the applied economists. ``It leads to an outpouring of useless theories which simply waste the time and energy of empirical researchersldotsthe theoretical model never become any better at explaining the observable phenomena.''

    it implies that ``the purpose of theory, at least in economics, is not to explain what actually happens under observable conditions but rather to determine, logically, the conditions that must be satisfied if a certain goal, to wit, the optimal allocation of resources, is to be satisfied.'' (230)

    ``The result is that, in economics, the imperatives of mathematics---with the emphasis on formal rather than on empirical proofs and on elegance rather than on relevance---have replaced the norms of science.'' (231)

    BibTeX:
    @book{eichner83,
      author = {Eichner, Alfred S.},
      title = {Why Economics is not Yet a Science},
      publisher = {M.E. Sharpe},
      year = {1983}
    }
    
    Eichner, A.S. The Megacorp and Oligopoly: Micro Foundations of Macro Dynamics 1976   book  
    Review: Ch.3

    Introduction

    This chapter is designed to derive an oligopolistic pricing
    model
    --`industry as a whole over the long run'. The upshot is that
    a megacorp's pricing decision is a deliberate action in order to
    achieve long-run growth of the firm by way of investment financed by
    internal and/or external funds.According to Lee, the
    internal-external fund issue not just technical. Eichner put an
    emphasis on the internal funds in a broader and radical manner.
    Theoretically it rejects neoclassical M-M theory (it needs
    more
    ). It implies that stock market is anti-business in the process
    of the accumulation of capital and development. The engine of
    accumulation and development is discretionary expenditure by
    business enterprise and government. As we see in the chapter 3,
    Eichner's monopolistic pricing model tells us why internal funds are
    important and how the funds is determined by way of pricing and the
    supply of and demand for investment. Thus pricing and investment
    mechanisms are closed connected. The oligopolistic pricing model
    hence is the basis of the Eichner's reformulation of the
    microeconomic theory.

    Note that the megacorp has three distinctive characteristics:
    quote
    small (1) ...it is characterized by a separation of management
    from ownership, with the effective decision-making power residing in
    the former; (2) ...production occurs within multiple power plants or
    plant segments, the factor coefficients for each of these plants or
    plant segments being fixed due to both technological and
    institutional constraints, and (3)...the firm's output is sold under
    conditions of recognized interdependence, the members of the
    industry engaging in what has been termed `joint profit
    maximization'. (p.3)
    end quote

    In addition, in the context of the oligopolistic industry a megacorp
    is the price-leader.

    The Absolute Price Level

    equation
    P = AVC + FC+CLSOR ot ERC
    equation

    where P is abs. price level, AVC is average variable costs,
    FC is fixed costs, SOR is standard operating ratio (or normal
    output ratio
    ), ERC is engineer-rated capacity.

    Corporate Levy (CL) is ``the `plus' added to variable and
    fixed costs" or ``the amount of internal funds required by the
    megacorp to finance its planned investment expenditures" (56, 61)
    Thus ``it is an amount deliberately decided upon by the megacorp so
    that it will have sufficient internal funds to achieve its long-run
    growth investment goals" (62).CL is an idiosyncratic
    notion. It is equivalent to retained earning, but since it is
    passive notion, Eichner made the new term, Corporate Levy.

    Average Corporate Levy: ACL is ``ex ante per unit
    (average) CL.
    math
    ACL = CLSOR ot ERC
    math,
    where SOR is standard operating ratio and ERC is
    engineer-rated capacity.

    Eichner's perception of time: The short-period is composed
    of pricing period (6-12 months, stable price), planning period (1-5
    years, new plant). The long-run is ``simply time horizon of the
    firm--what it expects to be the interval for current actions to have
    their ultimate impact" (Samules 2000: 93).Samuels, W. ed.
    (2000), Research in the History of Economic Thought and
    Methodology: Twenties-Century Economics
    , Amsterdam: JAI/Elsevier.

    Note that `the determinate solution' derived from the pricing model
    does not mean that there is a the long-run equilibrium position to
    which the industry will move over time. Rather the model provides
    the upper limit of the variations in price bounded by costs,
    realized CL, business cycle, interests and the like.

    A change in Price

    With AVC and FC held constant, a change in the price level of an
    oligopolistic industry must necessarily reflect a change in the
    required ACL. In turn ACL reflects a change in the demand for
    inv-funds over the planning period relative to the supply cost of
    those funds (65).

    math
    Delta P = f (D_I, S_I) end math \ where begin math D_I
    end math is demand for additional inv-funds and begin math
    S_I end math is supply cost of additional inv-funds.

    Regarding the supply of inv-funds there are two sources of
    inv-funds: internal financing and external (new debt) financing.

    Real costs of megacorp-price leader's increasing price:

    (1) The substitution effect: the loss of industry sales due
    to a increase in the relative price. It is the function of
    time since the substitution between goods entails the
    adjustment in the production techniques and taste preference. So the
    full effect takes time (67). The immediate effect is likely
    to be an increase in net revenue(or the total CL realized) which can
    improve the long-run market position of the megacorp (69). The br>long-run effect depends upon ``the anticipated immediate increase
    in the realized CL" and ``the possible eventual decline in the
    realized CL" (70). The latter is to be discounted at the
    present time. So it results in the implicit interest charge
    (math R_1 math = f(time, price elasticity ,
    and percent change in P(n))
    which can be compared both with the
    marginal efficiency of investment (r) and with the permanent
    rate of interest (i). Hence there is a positive relationship
    between n and math R_1 math.

    (2) The Entry Factor: decrease in the industry sales due to
    the entry of new firms. The barriers to entry: economies of
    scale, absolute cost advantages, and product differentiation (72).
    The long-run impact is based upon the relative weight between the
    immediate increase in inv-funds and (potential) eventual decline in
    the total CL. Again the entry factor results in math R_2
    math.

    (3) The possibility of meaningful government intervention:
    Any increase in P, if construed to be contrary to the public
    interest, may invoke gov-intervention which hampers the long-run
    growth of the megacorp or the industry (e.g., nationalization,
    taxation, etc) (77). Such impact or risk (math br>math) on the megacorp is positively related with n.
    And the gov-intervention sets the upper-limit on n.

    The supply curve of internally generated funds

    The S-curve reflects the differing amounts of additional
    inv-funds per planning period, math Delta Fp
    end math, that can be generated internally through CL at
    differing R which relies on n. math R = br>Delta CLPV of net CL math. The S-curve is curvelinear
    (with increasing rate)in R and math frac br>Fpmath dimension (see, Figure 10, p. 83). Simply speaking,
    when n increases (or P increases), R and
    CL increase and the latter finances investment in the
    following planning period.Eichner introduces R, in order
    to close the model. This is problematic in CR perspective.

    The cost of external funds (r) will be ``an average
    of the interest rate that must be paid on fixed-interest obligations
    and on equity shared, weighted by the current debt-equity ratio"
    (86). Thus, ``the megacorp-price leader, in determining this cost of
    external funds, need not be significantly affected by current money
    market conditions...it is only the change in the lowest level of
    interest rates over successive business cycles, not the change in
    the interest rates during any given business cycle, that is likely
    to alter the cost of external funds as the megacorp-price leader
    views that cost ex ante" (86). Thus in determining the
    source of inv-funds, the megacorp compares R and i,
    the permanent interest rate or the minimum cost during the most
    favorable phase in the business cycle (see, Figure 11, p. 87).

    The demand for investment funds

    Marginal Efficiency of Investment: the ratio of the
    increase in total CL realized to the amount of expenditure required.
    It implies that ``a megacorp will grow and prosper depending on how
    well it allocates the investment funds obtained through the CL"
    (88).As Sraffians (e.g., Garagnani) argue, it is a
    problematic conception.

    Four types of investmentIt is the development and
    in line with Chandler's theory.: (a) the purchase of new plant and
    equipment, (b) the differentiation of the industry's product, (c)
    the erection of higher barriers to entry, (d) the creation of a more
    favorable public image. Conventionally, in particular in
    neoclassical economics, the first type is perceived as `investment
    (demand).'

    The implication drawn from more broader definition of investment is
    that it provides ``a complete description of how prices are
    determined under oligopolistic conditions" (96).

    The determinate solution

    Derived math D_I end math and begin math S_I
    math determine ``what change in price, if any, will optimize
    the megacorp-price leader's long run market position" (97). However
    it does not mean that such a S-D structure generates unique
    equilibrium in neoclassical sense. Rather the structure provides the
    boundary for the rational behavior of a megacorp.

    Three possible outcomes:

    (1) D-curve does not intersect S-curve (Figure 12, p. 98). The
    megacorp maintains the previous amount of investment, as long as the return
    from expending some part of funds is positive. No additional
    investment is made.

    (2) D intersects S, at the lower level of R $<$ i. The
    demand for investment funds exceeds the amount already being
    obtained through the CL, and a price increase is necessary (Figure
    13).

    (3) D intersects S, and R $>$ i. Part of new investment
    is financed by internal funds and the rest is from the external
    funds, at the given rate i. The latter enables the megacorp to
    undertake a larger amount of investment than would otherwise be
    possible (math F_d - F_c math, in Figure 14).

    In sum, ``regardless of where the begin math D_I math and
    math S_I math curves intersect, the price in an
    oligopolistic industry is determinate.

    begin equation
    P_1 = P_0 + Delta P = AVC + FC+CLSOR ot ERC + Delta CLSOR ot ERC
    end equation

    Conclusion: The change in industry price is equal to the
    additional CL planned for or required ex ante divided by the
    anticipated level of sales. ``[H]olding costs constant, and change
    in the price of an oliogpolistic industry must reflect a change in
    either the marginal efficiency of investment for firms within that
    industry, the implicit interest charge on internal funds, or the
    `permanent' cost of external funds. In other words, the change in
    price will depend on the demand for and supply cost of additional
    investment funds" (101).

    scLarge Eichner (1976), Ch.5, Quotes

    ex ante investment is the common bond link micro and macro. (190)

    dynamic version of the Keynesian model -- Robinson, Kaldor (191)

    the rate of growth of investment and savings, aggregate output in oligopolistic sector -- macrodynamics

    Investment demand is the function of the marginal efficiency of investment and the expected growth rate of industry sales. the former is fluctuate within certain narrow limits. 193

    downward sloping investment demand

    most investment is to maintain the existing market share. 192
    the key determinant is the expected growth rate of industry sales

    endogenous force influencing the investment demand --

    accelerator model of investment -- Eisner (1960), 194
    ``changes in investment were related less to changes in aggregate demand than to changes in the demand experienced by individual industries, these changes being reflected in past sales figures (Eisner 1963), 194, previous 7 years. ``the aggregate investment demand function being simply the sum of these individual industry demand schedules" 194

    Eichner supports Eisner's result in the sense that it is empirically grounded and theoretically compatible with oligopolistic pricing (194)

    Eichner's investment demand function is independent of current economic conditons but the function of MEI and the expected output growth rates (backward and forward looking investment demand). 196-7

    Saving. corporate levy. function of industry price level, the national incremental wage pattern, tax rates, aggregate output growth rate

    ``The higher the price level, holding wages and tax rates constant, the greater will be the rate of growth of savings" (198)

    ``Over the intermediate run, however, to the extent that the fluctuations in industry sales are consistent with the anticipated cyclical pattern, the two effects should offset one another, with the result that investment can be expected to equal savings over the business cycle, both ex post and ex ante, even though they will not necessarily be equal to each other at any particular point in time. "(205)

    This S-I relations is different from Keynes's argument found in the GT. (206)

    This is due to the fact that ``only a minor portion of business investment is financed from external sources and that therefore the more significant adjustment process is that which takes place within the business sector itself, and, in particular, within the oligopolistic component of that sector" (206)

    relation between secular output growth rate, investment growth rate (rate of accumulation, Robinson's term), and savings growth rate. see graph, p. 207

    Technology and growth\br>``As the new technology becomes commercially exploitable, significantly altering consumption patterns, the secular growth rate for the business sector as a whole will increase even without any stimulus form the government and foreign sectors...Over time...these industries will tend to become oligopolistic as a result of the evolutionary process...The key point to be noted here is that this continued birth of new industries within the non-oligopolistic subsector through the impact of Schumpeterian grand inventions and even somewhat parler imitations is the primary source of autonomous growth within the business sector as a whole" (221)

    BibTeX:
    @book{eichner76,
      author = {Eichner, Alfred S.},
      title = {The Megacorp and Oligopoly: Micro Foundations of Macro Dynamics},
      publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
      year = {1976}
    }
    
    Eichner, A.S. & Kregel, J.A. An Essay on Post-Keynesian Theory: A New Paradigm in Economics 1975 Journal of Economic Literature
    Vol. 13(4), pp. 1293-1314 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{eichner75,
      author = {Eichner, Alfred S. and Kregel, Jan A.},
      title = {An Essay on Post-Keynesian Theory: A New Paradigm in Economics},
      journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
      year = {1975},
      volume = {13},
      number = {4},
      pages = {1293-1314}
    }
    
    Elsner, W. Why meso? On `aggregation' and `emergence' and why and how the meso level is essential in social economics 2007 Forum for Social Economics
    Vol. 36(1), pp. 1-16 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{elsner:07,
      author = {Wolfram Elsner},
      title = {Why meso? On `aggregation' and `emergence' and why and how the meso level is essential in social economics},
      journal = {Forum for Social Economics},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {36},
      number = {1},
      pages = {1-16}
    }
    
    Fleetwood, S. Sketching a socio-economic model of labour markets 2011 Cambridge Journal of Economics
    Vol. 35, pp. 15-38 
    article  
    Abstract: Using insights from the `socio-economics of labour markets' and building upon critical realist meta-theory, this paper offers the first sketch of a socio-economic model of labour markets as an alternative to the orthodox model.
    BibTeX:
    @article{fleetwood:11,
      author = {Steve Fleetwood},
      title = {Sketching a socio-economic model of labour markets},
      journal = {Cambridge Journal of Economics},
      year = {2011},
      volume = {35},
      pages = {15-38}
    }
    
    Fligstein, N. Neil Fligstein Answers Questions on the Present Financial Crisis 2009 Economic Sociology_the European Electronic Newsletter
    Vol. 11(1), pp. 41-44 
    article  
    Review: Scholars using metaphors such as structural holes, robust action, network society, network organization, and the view that networks produce either information or trust that allows the coordiantion of new ideas to produce new and successful markets completely missed the growth of the U.S. morgage securitization sector. (41)

    My critique of most of the literature on the financial services industry in economic sociology is that it has failed to analyze the fact that firms are the main entities that have organized different financial markets. (42)

    For me, the most important task is for us to do an autopsy on hte industry in order to see its creation, rise, spread and fall. (42)

    From the ``Architecture of Markets'' perspective, the cause of the crisis was the shift towards the subprime market and the role of the shift towards the subprime market and the role of regulators in allowing this to happen (43)

    It is likely that after almost collapsing the world economy, the remaining banks will pretty much continue business as usual. (44)

    BibTeX:
    @article{fligstein09,
      author = {Neil Fligstein},
      title = {Neil Fligstein Answers Questions on the Present Financial Crisis},
      journal = {Economic Sociology_the European Electronic Newsletter},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {11},
      number = {1},
      pages = {41-44}
    }
    
    Fligstein, N. The Architecture of Markets 2001   book  
    Abstract: .
    Review: sub-title: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-first-century Capitalist Societies
    BibTeX:
    @book{fligstein01,
      author = {Fligstein, Neil},
      title = {The Architecture of Markets},
      publisher = {Princeton University Press},
      year = {2001}
    }
    
    Fligstein, N. Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions 1996 American Sociological Review
    Vol. 61(4), pp. 656-673 
    article  
    Review: Sociological view of actions in markets.

    ``Capitalist firms could not operate without collective sets of rules governing interaction. While most modern discussions of state-building have focused on welfare and warfare, modern capitalist states have been constructed in interaction with the development of their economies, and the governance of economies is part of the core of state-building.'' (660)

    ``Property rights define the relation between an economic elite and the state'' (661)

    ``States can either intentionally or unintentionally upset the status quo of a given makret by chaning rules'' (661)

    BibTeX:
    @article{fligstein96,
      author = {Neil Fligstein},
      title = {Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions},
      journal = {American Sociological Review},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {61},
      number = {4},
      pages = {656-673}
    }
    
    Fligstein, N. The Transformation of Corporate Control 1990   book  
    Review: Cartel arrangements were inherently unstable (22).

    Given that cartels were uneforceable contracts in the United States and therefore inherently unstable, there were three alternative strategies of control over competition and prices. First, firms continued to engage in predatory trade practices to destroy their competitors through any means possible. Second, firms tried to have the federal government regulate industries in order to stabilize prices and profits.... Third, firms could end competition by combining the assets in a given product line. (23)

    The current vogue is to argue that the economy should be left alone. Investment decisions, merger decisions, and industrial policy should be placed in the hands of the largest firms who are most influential in the marketplace. But this argument ignores the fact that over time firms have operated under different conceptions which resulted from the dynamic interaction of the economic environment, the political environment, and the internal organization of the firm. The structures that are in place now are not the products of some pure process of competition. Nor has competition been weakened by the actions of government. Instead, what has come into existence is the result of a social and political process, the managers of the largest firms would continue to do what they are doing. Eliminating government regulation and antitrust enforcement will not automatically produce a more competititve world. (32)

    BibTeX:
    @book{fligstein90,
      author = {Neil Fligstein},
      title = {The Transformation of Corporate Control},
      publisher = {Harvard University Press},
      year = {1990}
    }
    
    Galbraith, J.K. Economics and the Public Purpose 1973   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{galbraith73,
      author = {Galbraith, John Kenneth},
      title = {Economics and the Public Purpose},
      publisher = {Houghton Mifflin},
      year = {1973}
    }
    
    Galbraith, J.K. The New Industrial State 1967   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{galbraith67,
      author = {Galbraith, John Kenneth},
      title = {The New Industrial State},
      publisher = {Houghton Mifflin},
      year = {1967}
    }
    
    Glasser, B.G. & Strauss, A.L. The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research 1967   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{glasser&strauss67,
      author = {Glasser, B. G. and A. L. Strauss},
      title = {The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research},
      publisher = {The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research},
      year = {1967}
    }
    
    Granovetter, M. Business Groups 1995 Handbook of Economic Sociology, pp. 453-475  incollection  
    BibTeX:
    @incollection{granovetter:95,
      author = {Granovetter, Mark},
      title = {Business Groups},
      booktitle = {Handbook of Economic Sociology},
      publisher = {Princeton University Press},
      year = {1995},
      pages = {453-475}
    }
    
    Groenewegen, J. Who Should Control The Firm? Insights From New And Original Institutional Economics 2004 Journal of Economic Issues
    Vol. 38(2), pp. 353-361 
    article  
    Review: The paper answers two questions: ``who should control the firm'' and ``how this can be done efficiently'', from two contending theoretical perspectives; the one being the new Institutional economics (both agency theory and transaction cost economic) and the other being the Original Institutional Economics.

    Good summary of two institutional economics.

    Groenewegen argues that two approaches are complementary; the former in the context of static, optimizing environment, the other in the context of social, historical-dynamic, cultural, power-laden environment.

    AT and TCE have in common thtat both work out of the characteristics of bounded rationaity and opportunism. Incomplete contracting ``in its entirety'' is control, meaning that prospective incentive and governance needs will be anticipated and are ``folded in''. So, the NIE takes the position that all parties that have a state in the firm should make contracts to the best of their ability; shareholders should be (represented) on the board of directors (356)

    [From the OIE perspective,] the answer to the question of who should control the firm should be based on a detailed analysis of the exisiting institutional arrangements and whose interests are served (357)

    Society will incorporate new instrumentally warranted patterns (techinical innovations) into the problem-solving process only to the extent that it can do so without the disruption of the existing pattern of ceremonial dominance (358).

    When the firms under investigation are characterized by specific habits, routines, and learning processes and when these firms are embedded in tightly coupled interfirm relationships, then an analysis cannot do without the concepts of OIE (359)

    BibTeX:
    @article{groenewegen04,
      author = {John Groenewegen},
      title = {Who Should Control The Firm? Insights From New And Original Institutional Economics},
      journal = {Journal of Economic Issues},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {38},
      number = {2},
      pages = {353-361}
    }
    
    Guerrien, B. Once Again on Microeconomics 2002 Post-Autistic Economics Review(No. 16)  article URL 
    BibTeX:
    @article{guerrien02,
      author = {Guerrien, Bernard},
      title = {Once Again on Microeconomics},
      journal = {Post-Autistic Economics Review},
      year = {2002},
      number = {No. 16},
      url = {http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue16/Guerrien16.htm}
    }
    
    Hamilton, W.H. Industrial Policy and Institutionalism 1974   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{hamilton74,
      author = {Walton H. Hamilton},
      title = {Industrial Policy and Institutionalism},
      publisher = {Augustus M. Kelley},
      year = {1974}
    }
    
    Harcourt, G.C. & Kenyon, P. Pricing and the investment decision 1976 Kyklos
    Vol. 29(3), pp. 449-77 
    article  
    Review: The link between pricing and investment through financing of a manufacturing firm in the short-run. the size of the margin aboe `normal' prime costs and the level of planned investment expenditure.
    BibTeX:
    @article{harcourtkenyon76,
      author = {Geoffrey C. Harcourt and Peter Kenyon},
      title = {Pricing and the investment decision},
      journal = {Kyklos},
      year = {1976},
      volume = {29},
      number = {3},
      pages = {449-77}
    }
    
    Hayden, F.G. Utilization of the Social Fabric Matrix to Articulate a State System of Financial Aid 2009 Institutional Analysis and Praxis: The Social Fabric Matrix Approach, pp. 209-235  incollection  
    Review: [226] Coceptual Conclusions

    The utilization of the SFM to define and explain the educational finance system of state aid to public school allows for insights into that system and for drawing conceptual conclusions about policy, student count, cost calculations, institutional theory, and systems principles.

    [230] SFM was innovated to provide a structure that would allow for the activation of the theory of concepts of scientific findigns, general systems analysis, and institutionalism.

    [231-2] Agents (with agency power) are contained in institutional components. Too often, in economic literature, agents are defined and treated like individuals. An agent is not an individual. An agent is a person party authorized and empowered by a principal to act in defined capacities. Agency is bestowed by the establishment of a relationship based on an understanding between persons and/or parties ofr an agent to act. Agents are not isolated or separate units because agency agreements are concerned with aaccountability, auditing, and performance. Most agents are institutional organizations (corporations, government departments, nonprofit organizations) that obtain agency status from other organizations. When persons sare given agent responsibilities, they are located in an institutional organization and deal with normative criteria.

    [232] SFM and systems principles---oopenness, feedback, evaluation, control: explaining hierarchy (of a structure) and commplexity

    [232] a real-world hierarchical system in which rulemaking and control are the consequences of integrated organizations that are sustained through a network of criteria, rules, regulations, requirements, and deliveries.

    [232] SFM assits in performing in-depth analysis of systems in order to find the complexity.

    BibTeX:
    @incollection{hayden:09b,
      author = {Hayden, F. Gregory},
      title = {Utilization of the Social Fabric Matrix to Articulate a State System of Financial Aid},
      booktitle = {Institutional Analysis and Praxis: The Social Fabric Matrix Approach},
      publisher = {Springer},
      year = {2009},
      pages = {209-235}
    }
    
    Hayden, F.G. Social Fabric Matrix: From Perspective to Analytical Tool 1982 Journal of Economic Issues
    Vol. 16(3), pp. 637-662 
    article  
    Review: Social Fabric Matrix (SFM) as an Institutionalist anlytical tool including the input-output matrix. SFM extends IOM by including social ceremonies, philosophy, enviornment, and technology. SFM is in line with Veblen's dichotomy (C. Ayres) and Polanyi's social evaluation that was later elaborated by Neal and Tool.

    [639] The power of this analytical approach [V's dichotomy] has been recognized by institutionalists and system theorists.

    [644, quoted from Polany's Instituted Process, p. 250] ``The human economy, then, is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and noneconomic. The inclusion of the noneconomic is vital. For religion or government may be as important for the structue and functioning of the economy as monetary institutions or the availability of tools and machines themselves that lighten the toil of labor."

    [644-5] John Dewey explicated the methodological inadequacies of ends-means thinking. This means, as William Kapp explained, that institutionalist models should not depend on cause-effect (or stimulus-response) representations of reality. Underlying the causality appraoch is the assumption that a state of affairs (effects) is the result of a state of affairs at a prior time (causes). This defines actors and institutions as passive and memoryless to the extent that we assume that effects are determined wholly by the mappign of the causes onto the effects. However, active social systems are maintained by the goals and rules changign with new situations and at different points in the process. A process is that transaction of trasdependent entities; it is a collection of rules that accoutns for the history of state transactions.

    [645] The [Social Fabric] matrix is meant to capture the characteristics of the parts, as well as the process of the whole. This is accomplished by a nonequilibrium, noncommon denomiantor process matrix,... there is no final demand, absolute requirement, or end to the process.

    [652] We can see from this simple example how impossible it would be to attempt to understand tyhe modern economy without a tool such as the social fabric matrix.

    BibTeX:
    @article{hayden:82,
      author = {F. Gregory Hayden},
      title = {Social Fabric Matrix: From Perspective to Analytical Tool},
      journal = {Journal of Economic Issues},
      year = {1982},
      volume = {16},
      number = {3},
      pages = {637-662}
    }
    
    Henry, J.F. On Equilibrium 1984-85 Journal of Post Keynesian Economics
    Vol. 6(2), pp. 214-229 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{henry84,
      author = {John F. Henry},
      title = {On Equilibrium},
      journal = {Journal of Post Keynesian Economics},
      year = {1984-85},
      volume = {6},
      number = {2},
      pages = {214-229}
    }
    
    Henry, J.F. The Illusion of the Epoch: Neoclassical Economics as a Case Study 2009 Studi e Note di Economia
    Vol. 1 
    article  
    Review: In a minority ruling class society, one based on the expropriation of output produced by a majority class (and, thus, a discordant, fractious society), the dominant class must attempt to convince the producers (serfs, slaves, workers) that the monority's interest are those of the populaiton as a whole. It must attempt to conceal the real foundation of society (or to turn reality upside down), and must present this society as the natural or rational form of organization which, in one form or another, has existed universally. Given control of the principle instruments of communication by those who are politically powerful, the dominant ideas that are produced and disseminated all promote the view that what exists is not only ``meek, right, and salutary," but normal. Thus, ideas that develop in a particular social context are inculcated as universal truths. This ``illusion of the epoch'' [Marx and Engels 1976, German Ideology, p, 157] is what I have termed elsewhere the ``universal principle'' (Henry 1990: 123, passim).
    BibTeX:
    @article{henry09a,
      author = {John F. Henry},
      title = {The Illusion of the Epoch: Neoclassical Economics as a Case Study},
      journal = {Studi e Note di Economia},
      year = {2009},
      volume = {1}
    }
    
    Henry, J.F. ``Bad'' Decisions, Poverty, and Economic Theory: The Individualist and Social Perspectives in Light of ``The American Myth'' 2007 Forum for Social Economics
    Vol. 36, pp. 17-27 
    article  
    Review: ``individual decision-making cannot be the cause of poverty'' - poverty is a collective issue or a systemic issue. not of individual decision. see Levine 08.

    ``the individualists explanation of poverty is linked to the neoclassical framework, and that this individualist explanation is a product of the (capitalist) eocnomic system itself which then induces an ideology both privileging such an explanation and preventing the development of satisfactory theory that would inform porper policy.''

    ``for a decision to be bad requires that the decision-maker know with certainty the outcome of tha decision before it is made.'' (19)

    ``Decisions, while they may be made at the individual level, are not made in a social vacuum. The same decision will (or may) produce quite different results depending on the social circumstances that surround the decision-maker. While individuals surely exist, they are not socially isolated entities, but, rather, socially constructed (or socially constrained) individuals'' (19) >> micro-macro link ``If property rights are well articulated and non-attenuated, then individuals are responsible for their own actions (and decision). Decisions are made that result in specific outcomes, and these decisions are reduced to a benefit-cost calculation.'' (21)

    Quote form Adam Smith: ``Whatever there is great property, there is great inequality. For one very rich man, there must be at least five hundred poor'' (Smith, WN, 670) ``Poverty is endemic to capitalism'' (Henry 23) ``capitalism requires exploitation, and exploitation mandates a systematic division into rich and poor" (23)

    Henry through Polanyi: ``the history of capitalism has been, in a fundamental sense, the history of attempts (with varying degrees of success) to find institutional palliatives to contain the amount and severity of poverty that is demanded by that very same economic system that would be eliminated were poverty allowed to develop to its ``natural'' levles.'' (24) ``if the cause of poverty is the economic organization itself, the solution is to rid society of that organization-capitalism must be replaced by a socially organized production process in which the objective of production is to produce use values rather than profitable exchange values. Short of this, what can be done to ameliorate poverty?'' (24)

    (Quasi-) Keynesian view: ``poverty is directly correlated with unemployment....``Full'' employment is the solution to poverty'' (24) ``such a [full employment] policy would be ineffective-or, at a minimum, would not achieve the stated objective of ending poverty (assuming this is even possible within the constraints of a capitalist economic order)."" (24)

    1960's War on Poverty: fiscal stimuli (tax reductions) to reduce poverty. JKG and Leon Keyserling viewed that ``demand creation measures as insufficient.'' (24) ``The ``structuralists'' were correct. While extra-market demand stimulation clearly is important in alleviateing poverty, it is insufficient. To the extent that poverty is linked ot employment, and that levels and types of employment are determined by the underlying economic arrangements, then incomes, based on the amount and forms of employment, must have something to do with the ability to secure jobs--and this requires the development of necessary skills.'' (25) ``The aggreate demand approach essentially relies on private firms to provide the employment that will alleviate poverty.'' (25) ``Such programs have already been developed and go by different names: Employer of Last Resort, Buffer Stock Employment Program, and others (see Forstarter 19999; Mitchell 1998; Wray 1998). They are all compatible with capitalism and can be shown to make capitalism a more congenial and viable system.'' (25) -- this is the point to start the microeocnomic welfare theory which goes beyond macroeconomic demand policy that is undertaken within the capitalist system and that assumes the good government.

    ``If there is agreement that the cause of poverty is the very nature of a capitalist economy, then capitalist government, which claim to represent the interests of all the citizenary, should be required to institute remedial programs to alleviate the worst consequences of that system'' (26) --- Henry's conclusion.

    BibTeX:
    @article{henry07,
      author = {John F. Henry},
      title = {``Bad'' Decisions, Poverty, and Economic Theory: The Individualist and Social Perspectives in Light of ``The American Myth''},
      journal = {Forum for Social Economics},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {36},
      pages = {17-27}
    }
    
    Henry, J.F. Property Rights, Markets and Economic Theory: Keynes versus Neoclassicism--again 1999 Review of Political Economy
    Vol. 11(2), pp. 151-170 
    article  
    Abstract: This essay has two main objectives. Initially, I specify the relationship between neoclassical theory and the property rights regime on which that theory rests. In this portion of the argument I show that the property rights consisent with neoclasscial theory are inconsistent with those of a monetary (or capitalist) economy--the economy the theory purports to explain. Further, I specify several contradicitons in the theory itself when it attempts to examine rational resource allocation, money and the labor market. Secondly, I show that Keynes's General Theory rests on a fundamentally different foundation than that of neoclassicism. His views on money, the labor market equilibrium etc. are in radical opposition to those orthodoxy. In addition, his theory does not share the same position on property rights. Because of these considerations, Keynes cannot be understood by those economists holding the neoclasscial perspective.
    BibTeX:
    @article{henry99,
      author = {John F. Henry},
      title = {Property Rights, Markets and Economic Theory: Keynes versus Neoclassicism--again},
      journal = {Review of Political Economy},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {11},
      number = {2},
      pages = {151-170}
    }
    
    Henry, J.F. The Making of Neoclassical Economics 1990   book  
    Review: Goal of the book: ``The task set forth here, then, is to examine the historical evolution of the neoclassical standard, attempting to demonstrate its relatin to institutional changes within capitalist society. What will be shown is that the theory reflects the dominant relationships within capitalist society and has been developed and modified to accommodate changes within this form of social organization. Hence, neoclassicism does not stand above or apart from society, but is, as with all social ideas, conditioned by that society. This calls into question the claim of scientific neutrality, held to be a hallmark of neoclasscial economics" (xvii)

    Questions: ``why theory develops, and why theories of a particular type develop when they do. To attempt any answer to this question, we must examine the relation between society and theory." ``What is termed `neoclassical eocnomics' was not always the prevailing view of the discipline. To reach its current position, it had to wrest ideological domination from the older, classical general theory" (xvi)

    Theory and Soceity: ``just as institutional arrangements and ideological arrangements are accepted because they exist, so are ideas" (xvi) ``What we find, then, is that society's position on normalcy or decency will be determined largely by the social institutions and ideas that are dominant" (xvii) ``society itself throws up and controls the dissemination of those ideas. Hence one must identify the relationship between social formation and change, aand theory" (xviii) ``It is, in fact, difficult for an individual to evaluate those ideas once they have seized on his or her mind, regardless of the objective evidence. However, the case may be more compelling if one steps outside existing society and ideology" (239) ``As well, one may be dishonest merely by omitting mention of competing theories. And once the minority ruling class ideology is in place, and is the sole ideology to which one is trained, it is not surprising that such an omission occurs. Of course, this is an example of unconscious dishonesty, and mere continues the conscious fraud that was initially developed"(241) ``Even where vulgarization of heretical theories takes place, this is not necessarily a sign of conscious dishonesty. If one hold orthodox ideology by virue of one's training, then examines heretical theory on the basis of that ideology, it is almost inevitable that bastard notions of that theory will develop." (241) ``so the longer that irrational soceity exists, the more irrational, abstract, and irrelevant the theory supporting it must become" (243) ``to remove theory from its historical and social context is to allow the rationalization of any henomenon on a purely idealistic basis, whether this is of the axiomatic or the religious approach. As society becomes increasingly irrational, the theory must increasingly divorce itself from tis social foundations, analyze increasingly mythical and abstract notions, and thus, prove increasingly incapable of assisting that society in attempting to solve the problems which it throws up. That is, the theory becomes hopelessly bankrupt though consiereably more `elegant'" (243)

    ``Uner a conditions of oligopoly, capitalists maximize profits by restricting output in order to `wht the traffic will bear.''' --- veblen's sabotage. (178)

    ``Basically, one class--capitalists--organizes to restrict the economic well-being of the community as a whole in order to advantage itself.'' (178)

    BibTeX:
    @book{henry90,
      author = {John F. Henry},
      title = {The Making of Neoclassical Economics},
      publisher = {Unwin Hyman},
      year = {1990}
    }
    
    Henry, J.F. On economic theory and the question of solvability 1986 Journal of Post Keynesian Economics
    Vol. 8(3), pp. 371-386 
    article  
    Review: It is extremely easy to construct a theory of an idealized type which is divorced from underlying economic raelity. Such a scholastic exercise can be made to generate conclusions (through correct choice of assumptions) which guarantee a problem--free economy--if the prescriptions contained within the theory are followed. As such theories are developed independent of actual social constraints, the policy formulations are then midless of the actual cause of economic difficulties and, therefore, can offer no assistance in solving those problems. In short, there should be not problems: If these exist if an only be because the world does not conform to the theory which purports to explain economic reality. (372-3).

    That is, reason could prevail if only people, particularly those of the upper classes, would behave reasonably. (374)

    Ricardo's theory displays contradictions precisely because the world he was examining displayed contradictions. That is, the social reality contained features which prevented he casting of that social reality into neat, general equilibrium form. (376)

    according to Marx, caitalism was so structured that its internal contradictions simply did not allow it to solve the problems it threw up. In fact, the problems were the result of the organization of society itself. (376)

    If society is not so structured--if it is based upon nonharmonious, contradictory, and antagonistic relations--then rectification models must necessarily be divorcd from reality if they are to be ``successful.'' In addition, policy developed on the basis fo such theories must then be inappropriated or inadequate to solve the problems for shich these policies were created. (377)

    Theories that do not first examine this soical foundation are prone to reach conclusions having no social import. That is, they are drawn up independently of society and their solutions merely requrie the adjustment of variables which the theories themselves; society is to conform to the theorists's notions of solvability. (378)

    This ``universality principle'' is what Veblen terms '`normality'': (380)

    If, indeed, such laws are universal constants, they have always existed and there can be no issue of, say, the formation of private property relations. (381)

    pre-determined ends followed from determiend ``givens.'' (381)

    mechanical systems of thought, while perhaps advancing inquiry, must necessarily fail at some point because they contain no mechanism for adjusting to change. At best, they can be true for only a limited area of inquiry or within a particular peirod of time. (382)

    if solvable theories are universal (and eternal) in their truths and divorced from the underlying social reality, then man is not a ``prime mover.'' Rather, humans, and society as a whole, merely respond to extra-societal laws and forces over which they exert no control. Rather than shaping society (and in turn being shaped by that society), humans are shaped by non-social elements--for all time and in all places (382)

    What Blaug wants from Marx (and presumably from others) is a mechanistic theory that reaches on end-point and no other. Blaug thus trivializes Marxist theory, reduces it to a set of deterministic formulae. (384)

    For Marx, society was a complex of ever-changing structures...For Marx and Veblen, ... , man was the prime mover: History was not the result of supersocietal forces over which people had no control and whih they had no part in making. Thus, for Marx, the best one can do is the take the social order as given, study its inter-relationships, estiamte what could happen under particular circumstances, and predict the various responses to such developments. And these responses cold very well not be able to sovle the problems thrown up simply because the social structure itself was incapable of allowing such solutions. Laws of tendency, then, are the best the theorists could do. (384)

    I am not arguing that all policy is necessarily doomed to failure or that economits should simply ignore policy-making in their prescriptions for an ailing economy. However, if policy directives are to be effective, they must be developed on the basis of a concrete examination of the economic organization to which they are directed. (385)

    it is no wonder that the population is bombarded with arguments promising solutions that are efficient and painless. During every period of economic crisis the same phenomenon is observed. When problems are severe and prevailing theory is helpless, the snake oil and paten medicines are trotted out to be planced on the public display (385)

    What is not required for those economists interested in salvaging the economics system, and in redeeming the human misery brought by economic malfunctioning, is a thorough restructuring of theory based, initially, on an objective examination of the underlying economic system itself. For a social science to advance the course of human welfare through correct policy formulation, it must first criticize that which exists. And it must consider the possibilities that observed problems are endemic to the economic system and cannot be eliminated within that system's constraints. To solve socal problems may require the elimination of the social order which create them. (385)

    BibTeX:
    @article{henry86,
      author = {John F. Henry},
      title = {On economic theory and the question of solvability},
      journal = {Journal of Post Keynesian Economics},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {8},
      number = {3},
      pages = {371-386}
    }
    
    Hodgson, G.M. From Micro to Macro: the Concept of Emergence and the Role of Institutions 2000 Institutions and the Role of the State, pp. 103-126  incollection  
    BibTeX:
    @incollection{hodgson00,
      author = {Geoffrey M. Hodgson},
      title = {From Micro to Macro: the Concept of Emergence and the Role of Institutions},
      booktitle = {Institutions and the Role of the State},
      publisher = {Edward Elgar},
      year = {2000},
      pages = {103-126}
    }
    
    Hodgson, G.M. Evolution and Optimality 1994 The Elgar Companion to Institutional and Evolutionary Economics, pp. 207-212  incollection  
    Review: Arguing against Panglossian and Spencerian (+Friedman, Williamson,) notion of social darwinism which ends up with efficient outcome of individual-institutional outcome. That is, survivial (outcome) is presumed as an efficient, fittest, and improvements from the initial condition. From a modern evolutionay perspective, Hodgson argues, that such a conception of evolution is not permitted in biology as well as social science (economics).

    Social strcutures and its individual components are in their nature of variety and hence selection/rejection process is in operation. The co-existence and cybernetic (or feedback) relationship between individual behavior and strcutures coupled with path-dependency (``a result of history) tells us that the evolutionary process is nothing to do with optimality. The evolutionary process also reject the fallacy of composition in the sense that it does not lead to the presumption that ``the selection of fitter individuals always lead to the selection of fitter population" (211). Throughout the article, Hodgson tries to make use of biological evolution in explaining the socio-economic development.

    BibTeX:
    @incollection{hodgson94,
      author = {Geoffrey M. Hodgson},
      title = {Evolution and Optimality},
      booktitle = {The Elgar Companion to Institutional and Evolutionary Economics},
      publisher = {Edward Elgar},
      year = {1994},
      pages = {207-212}
    }
    
    Hodgson, G.M. & Knudsen, T. The firm as an interactor: firms as vehicles for habits and routines 2004 Journal of Evolutionary Economics
    Vol. 14, pp. 281-307 
    article  
    Review: ``Darwinism involves a set of general principles that apply to all evolving systems involving variation, inheritance and selection. The most important service rendered by these general principles is to help explain the evolution of widespread but incredible levels of complexity in reality" (282).

    ``Even in the social context, where acquired characters might be inherited, such Lamarckism requires Darwinism to complete its explanations, and is not an alternative to it" (283)

    ``However, while evolving systems may be subject to a core set of Darwinian principles, the notion of Universal Darwinism itself provides no alternative to a detailed explanation of the particular emergent properties and processes at the social level. Acceptance of Universal Darwinism does not provide all the necessary causal mechanisms and explanations for the social scientist, not obviate the elaborate additional work of specific investigation and detailed causal explanation in the social sphere" (284).

    ``Darwinian principles provide a general explanatory framework into which particular explanations have to be placed" (285)

    habits: propensity to act in a specific way. it may exist even if it is not manifest in behavior. habits operate at the individual level.

    routines: operate at the group (organization) level. `organizational analogue of habits' (289) firms to firm. `meso'. routines contain emergent properties (296). ``Sometimes routines are spread or cloned as a result of laws or rules that emanate from a third organization, such as the state or an association of employers" (291). ``...routines are repositories of knowledge that is not readily codified or sold" (301).

    `the organization thus has a life in addition to its members' (290)

    ``selection takes places around deeply embedded and durable rules" (288)

    ``The human individual is an interactor. Firms are made up of individuals and their interrelations. Hence, if firms are also interactors, then we have a hierarchy of interactors and evolutionary processes operating on more than one level"(300)

    ``We suggest that the firm typically provides such structure and cohesion. The firm can provide a corporate culture and structural environment, consisting of behavioural norms and routinised practices, which can augment individual skills and output per person...The importance of structured relationship within the firm, the effects of corporate norms and culture, and the consequential firm-specific capabilities and learning effects, mean that the firm typically has the necessary cohesion to qualify as an interactor"(301).

    ``...the firm is not simply an aggregate of individuals, physical capital and codifiable knowledge. It also consists of idiosyncratic structures, relationships and routines that typically are not readily tradable and are specific to the firm itself."

    ``the idea that the firm can be treated as an interactor, ties in directly with the idea that firms are selected through competition in a market environment, and that this is part of one level of the full, multi-level selection theory that must be constructed in order to understand socio-economic evolution" (302).

    BibTeX:
    @article{hodgson-knudsen04,
      author = {Hodgson, Geoffrey M. and T. Knudsen},
      title = {The firm as an interactor: firms as vehicles for habits and routines},
      journal = {Journal of Evolutionary Economics},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {14},
      pages = {281-307},
      note = {see my sum and note}
    }
    
    Hoover, K.D. Idealizing Reduction: The Microfoundations of Macroeconomcs 2008   unpublished  
    Abstract: This paper explores the interrelationship between reductionism and idealization in the microfoundational program and the role of idealization in empirical modeling.
    Review: Microfoundations theses:
    Thesis 1: Individuals lie behind agregates in the sense that without individuals there would be no aggregates. -- most economists.

    Thesis 2: How individuals behave affects or conditions how aggregates behave. -- some including Keynes

    Thesis 3: Aggregates are nothing else but the addition of individual behavior. -- dominant view in the mainstream. ``euthanasia of macroeconomics''.

    ``The idea tht macroeconomics not only needs microfoundations, but that microeconomics can replace macroeconomics completely is the dominant position in modern economics''. ( 27)

    Lucas critique (p.4): functional relationships represented by macro variables do not capture the causal structure that generate them. Thus at best condition prediction can be done. Or policymakers should adopt the rules, rather than exploiting the shaky functional relationships. Hoover argues that, interestingly and rightly, ``appropriate model must capture the intentinal actions of economic agents'' (4).

    This sheds light on critial realist approach and Veblen as seemingly opposed to neo-Schumpeterians.

    Aggregation (5): ``Perfect aggregation--the situation in which aggregates behave as scaled up versions of microeconomic quantities-- is possible only under conditions that are certainly never realized''

    Two conditions are: 1) Identical preference: you and Bill Gates hae the same preferences. 2) Homothetic preference: Bill Gates, the billiionaire, must spend the same proportion of his incme on, say, chocolate as would an impoverished Bill Gates. ``Without perfect aggregation, there is no fixed relationship between the functional forms that might govern aggregates and those that describe the behavior of individuals'' (5)

    Optimization: ``The Leviathan's optimization is shown to be equivalent to an optimizatin problem with agregate prices, wages, and interest rates, as if there were markets for GDP, agregate labor, and aggregate money rather than markets for golf balls, accountants, and particular withdrawals from ATM machines." (7)

    "Any market imperfection renders the second theorem of welfare economics false'' Idealization: ``Since these models, do not in fact characterize each and every agent in an economy, they are best understood as employing a strategy of idealization." ``I accetp idealization as a strategy of model building. But legitimate idealization requires that the idealized model capture the essence of the causal structure or underlying mechanisms at work. It is ony on that basis that we can trust the model to analyze situations other than the data at hand'' (28).

    [Jo] The impossibility of representing every heterogeneous individuls requires that causal mechanisms be identified, in which an individual--who is class, culture, and institution dependent--plays a particular role.

    "workable microfoundations of macroeconomics" critiques of general equilibrium model (22-23)

    ``the general price level is an emergent property of macroeconomic systems and ontologically distinct from, while nonetheless supervenient on, the prices of individual goods'' (25)

    ``The essence of the criticism of the common strategies of reducing microeconomics to macroeconomics is that it is based in model building that mixes legitimate idealization with non-ideal, particular model assumptions and then relies on those assumptions at critical juncture in providing the derivation of the macroeconomic relationships from miroeconomic behaviors" (29)

    BibTeX:
    @unpublished{hoover08,
      author = {Kevin D. Hoover},
      title = {Idealizing Reduction: The Microfoundations of Macroeconomcs},
      year = {2008}
    }
    
    Howe, M. A Study of Trade Association Price Fixing {1972-73} Journal of Industrial Economics
    Vol. 21, pp. 236-256 
    article  
    Review: Target profit margin.
    ``The magnitude of the target margin was, of course, decidedby members by discussion and negotiation in the light of their experience of market conditions facing the industry as wel as their individual profit objectives.'' (242)
    BibTeX:
    @article{howe72,
      author = {M. Howe},
      title = {A Study of Trade Association Price Fixing},
      journal = {Journal of Industrial Economics},
      year = {1972-73},
      volume = {21},
      pages = {236-256}
    }
    
    Hutchinson, F. & Mellor, M. Capitalist Materialism Monetised Markets versus Social Provisioning: Proposals for the socialisation of `the Economy' 2004   conference  
    BibTeX:
    @conference{hutchinson-mellor:04,
      author = {Frances Hutchinson and Mary Mellor},
      title = {Capitalist Materialism Monetised Markets versus Social Provisioning: Proposals for the socialisation of `the Economy'},
      year = {2004}
    }
    
    Jo, T.-H. A Heterodox Microfoundation of Business Cycles 2011 Heterodox Analyses of Financial Crisis and Reform  incollection  
    Review: According to Jo, the instability of capitalism is not only the outcome of economic activities under fundamental uncertainty, but also closely associated with the capitalist social order that is to be protected for the sake of the vested interests of the ruling class. In this regard, ``what is really meant by instability in the heterodox perspective is not the irregularity in quantitative variables (or empirical reality), but the uncertainty/insecurity of life and the unreliability of capitalist market principles.'' (p. #). The account of instability thus requires both micro and macro analysis as well as both economic and social inquiry. To expand the horizon of the heterodox theory of business cycles, Jo argues, the frictionless notion of a capitalist society and the class-neutral notion of the capitalist state received by many heterodox economists (e.g., Schumpeter and Minsky) are to be questioned and reconsidered.

    The micro-instability qua the vulnerability of the life of agents as well as the macro-instability qua cycles and crises along with the deregulated financial system are not the result of unexpected shocks or market failures, but the outcome of deliberate (often short-sighted) actions made by the private business enterprises and the state. Such an argument is detailed and strengthened by the analysis of the monetary production economic with an emphasis on the business decision making process.

    BibTeX:
    @incollection{jo:11b,
      author = {Tae-Hee Jo},
      title = {A Heterodox Microfoundation of Business Cycles},
      booktitle = {Heterodox Analyses of Financial Crisis and Reform},
      publisher = {Edward Elgar},
      year = {2011}
    }
    
    Jo, T.-H. Saving Private Business Enterprises: A Heterodox Microecnomic Approach to Market Governance and Market Regulation 2011 The American Journal of Economics and Sociology  article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{jo:11d,
      author = {Tae-Hee Jo},
      title = {Saving Private Business Enterprises: A Heterodox Microecnomic Approach to Market Governance and Market Regulation},
      journal = {The American Journal of Economics and Sociology},
      year = {2011}
    }
    
    Jo, T.-H. Microfoundations of Effective Demand 2007 School: University of Missouri--Kansas City  phdthesis  
    BibTeX:
    @phdthesis{jo07,
      author = {Tae-Hee Jo},
      title = {Microfoundations of Effective Demand},
      school = {University of Missouri--Kansas City},
      year = {2007}
    }
    
    Kalecki, M. Essays on Developing Economies 1976   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{kalecki76,
      author = {Michał Kalecki},
      title = {Essays on Developing Economies},
      publisher = {The Harvester Press},
      year = {1976},
      note = {Intoduction by Joan Robinson}
    }
    
    Kalecki, M. Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy 1933-1970 1971 , pp. 138-145  book  
    Review: Kalecki argues the full emplyment policy directed by capitalist state in term of class relation. As Keynesians, circa the Great Depression, insist that it is necessary to use government spending financed by loans to achieve full employment. Kalecki maintains that this position is fallacious and unrealistic since those followers of Keynes do not take into account the class relation (capitalists, or captains of industry, workers, and rentiers), and political realities which those capitains oppose full-employment policy even though full employment may result in bigger profits. The suggested reasons of the opposition are; dislike of gov intervention, dislike of public inv and subsidiing consumption, and dislike of possible social and political changes. First, in the laisser-faire capitalism 'the state of confidence' of capitalists (investors) governs the level of employment (by way of investment, ""EFFECTIVE DEMAND"). This means that capitalists has a control over government policy. So they don't want 'functional finance' (although Kalecki did not use this term). They require 'SOUND FINANCE' in order to maintain the control of markets. Second capitalists oppose both public investments and subsidizing consumption due to various reasons. It is interesting that Kalecki claims 'MORAL principle' with regard to the subsidizing. This sheds light on the prevalence of business principle. Finally, "Their class instinct tells them that lasting full employment is unsound from their point of view and that unemployment is an integral part of the normal capitalist system." (141) Another point Kalecki made here is that in the fascist state the capitalist opposition is 'opposed' by the totalitarian state. So there is no such issues of intervention, sound finance, and the like. However he, quite similar to many Marxisits such as Sweezy and Baran, in particular, argues that military capitalism would end up with the most irrationality of human being: 'war'. In all, Kalecki argues the economic issues of unempolyment in a less theoretical but convincing manner. We can find the link between Marx and Keynes.
    BibTeX:
    @book{kalecki71,
      author = {Kalecki, Michał},
      title = {Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy 1933-1970},
      publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
      year = {1971},
      pages = {138-145}
    }
    
    Katzner, D.W. The significance, success, and failure of microeconomic theory 2001 Journal of Post Keynesian Economics
    Vol. 24(1), pp. 41-58 
    article  
    Review: origins of the terms, micro and macro. see page 44 (also, it was discussed in HES mailing list in April, 2007) NC individuals: ``nonsentient, nonthinking, and unmotivated physical entitities" (53)
    BibTeX:
    @article{katzner01,
      author = {Donald W. Katzner},
      title = {The significance, success, and failure of microeconomic theory},
      journal = {Journal of Post Keynesian Economics},
      year = {2001},
      volume = {24},
      number = {1},
      pages = {41-58},
      note = {Good intro to micro and critiques of nc micro}
    }
    
    Kay, N.M. Theory of the Firms 1994
    Vol. IThe Edward Elgar Companion to Institutional and Evolutionary Economics, pp. 237-241 
    incollection  
    Review: ``For most of its history, the theory of the firm has not been concerned with the behaviour of firms, but with the behaviour of markets"

    Adam Smith: ``the firm as the agent of progress and the means of coordinating economic activity"--pin factory

    Marshall: firms in the process of resource allocation -- supply and demand. ``While Marshall helped develope and refine the marginalist apparatus, much of his informal discussion emphasized the importance of factors that could not be properly captured by formal analysis." such as technological change, decision making and knowledge, with entrepreneurship and organization. In modern economics, starting with

    Robinson (1933) and Chamberlin (1932) >> downward sloping firm demand curve ``As Loasby (1976) points out, the reduction of the theory of the firm to an automatic signalling system, in which market prices determine resource allocation and decision making and entrepreneurship are absent, means that in the theory of the firm there are now no firms" (238) and hence no industrial organization either >> black box theory

    Cyert and March (1963): adopt Herbert Simon's bounded rationality. Under uncertainty, decision makers try to satisfise rather than maximize.

    Penrose (1959): theory of growth of the firm changes the conception of the firm from one in which resourse allocation is determined by relative prices in specified product-markets to one in which the firm is an evolving bundle of resources, in particular managerial resources, capable of changing the boundaries of the firm and so bringing problems of growth, diversifiction, acquisition and merger onto the agenda of the theory of the firm" (239) -- non-equilibrium theory of the firm

    Marris (1964) -- growth maximizing firm

    Coase (1937) costs of using the price mechanism

    Williamson (1975) the firm as an alternative to market resource allocation in the competitive institutional framework.

    Schumpeter (1942): the fundamental engine of economic development as being technological change; competition in terms of new products and processes, rather than price

    Nelson and Winter (1982): Following Schumpeter, devleoped behavioral aspects of the firm -- behavioral decision rules and search pprocesses.

    BibTeX:
    @incollection{kay94,
      author = {Neil M. Kay},
      title = {Theory of the Firms},
      booktitle = {The Edward Elgar Companion to Institutional and Evolutionary Economics},
      publisher = {Edward Elgar},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {I},
      pages = {237-241}
    }
    
    Keen, S. Debunking Economics 2002   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{keen02,
      author = {Steve Keen},
      title = {Debunking Economics},
      publisher = {Zed Books},
      year = {2002}
    }
    
    Kesting, S. Keynesian Microeconomics and Institutional Change 2006   conference  
    Review: ``One can come across the often repeated and nontheless wrong belief that Keynes had an underdeveloped micro foundation for his macro economic theories (e.g. Winter 1997: 11). However, this misinterpretation is due to the common understanding that a conception of micro economics has to be based on methodlogical individualism and assumptions of high degrees of autonomy in individual choice" (2) ``Keynes's taxonomy of four types of economic behaviours: rational calculation, speculation, following conventions and impulse based on animal spirit (Keynes1936, ch.12, 1937) includes a variant resembling the neoclassical atomistic rational maximisation as a special case" (3) ``Keynes did not deny that people would try to act as utilitarins; this is the element of truth in the picture of Keynes as utilitarian. However, he believed that their attempt to do so required a ``false rationalization" because of uncertainty and organic unities or that rational self-interest was not necessarily rational after all" (Fitzgibbon 1988, 95) - Athol Fitzgibbons (1988), Keynes's vision: A New Political Economy, Clarendon: Oxford ``Weight and probability are indepedent characteristics of an argument -- as the amount of available information expands, weight will always increse, whereas probability may rise or fall. Weight reflects the total amount of information, but probability depends on the balance between its favourable and unfavourable parts" (O'Donnell 1991, 7) Keynes continued to use this microeconomic notion of probablistic decision making under uncertainty in the General Theory. (Kesting, 5) ``The pluralism of Keynes's modes of behaviour can be interpreted as a scale of different types as well as degrees of rationality. In exceptional clear circumstances it might be possible to calculate optimal economic action in terms of their consequences (the neoclassical ideal or standard situation). In cases where this is not possible one should try to obtain convincing, weighted probability expectations (Keynes's ideal). If even this is not achievable, the better motive counts (Kant's ideal): ``When there is radical uncertainty, then the rationality of motives rather than ends comes into play" (Fitzgibbons 1988, 101) Agents is a institutional making and institution changing actor so as to ``permit agents to deal with, and control the outcomes of, otherwise uncertain future" (Davidson 1989, 481) - Davidson (1989), ``The Economics of Ignorance or Ignorance of Economics?". in Critical Review 3 (40), 467-487
    BibTeX:
    @conference{kesting06,
      author = {Stefan Kesting},
      title = {Keynesian Microeconomics and Institutional Change},
      year = {2006}
    }
    
    King, J.E. Microfoundations? 2009 Macroeconomic Policies on Shaky Foundations : Whither Mainstream Economics  incollection  
    Review: PK does not need microfoundations. Micro and macro are parallel. They can be horizontally reltaed.
    BibTeX:
    @incollection{king08,
      author = {John E. King},
      title = {Microfoundations?},
      booktitle = {Macroeconomic Policies on Shaky Foundations : Whither Mainstream Economics},
      publisher = {Metropolis},
      year = {2009},
      note = {Paper prepared for the 12th conference on ``Macroeconomic Policies on Shaky Foundations -- Whither Mainstream Economics?'', The Research Network Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Policies, Berlin, Germany. October 31}
    }
    
    Kregel, J.A. The Integration of Micro and Macroeconomics through Macrodynamic Megacorps 1991 The Megacorp & Macrodynamics, pp. 133-142  incollection  
    BibTeX:
    @incollection{kregel91,
      author = {Kregel, Jan A.},
      title = {The Integration of Micro and Macroeconomics through Macrodynamic Megacorps},
      booktitle = {The Megacorp & Macrodynamics},
      publisher = {M.E. Sharpe},
      year = {1991},
      pages = {133-142}
    }
    
    Kriesler, P. Microfoundations: a Kaleckian Perspective 1996 An Alternative Macroeconomic Theory: the Kaleckian Model and Post Keynesian Economics, pp. 55-72  incollection  
    BibTeX:
    @incollection{kriesler96,
      author = {Kriesler, Peter},
      title = {Microfoundations: a Kaleckian Perspective},
      booktitle = {An Alternative Macroeconomic Theory: the Kaleckian Model and Post Keynesian Economics},
      publisher = {Kluwer},
      year = {1996},
      pages = {55-72}
    }
    
    Kriesler, P. Kalecki's Microanalysis 1987   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{kriesler87,
      author = {Peter Kriesler},
      title = {Kalecki's Microanalysis},
      publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
      year = {1987}
    }
    
    Kurz, H.D. & Salvadori, N. Theory of Production: A Long-Period Analysis 1995   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{kurz-salvadori:95,
      author = {Heinz D. Kurz and Neri Salvadori},
      title = {Theory of Production: A Long-Period Analysis},
      publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
      year = {1995}
    }
    
    López, J. & Mott, T. Kalecki Versus Keynes on the Determinants of Investment 1999 Review of Political Economy
    Vol. 11(3), pp. 291-301 
    article  
    Abstract: This paper explores the differences between the investment theories of Michal Kalecki and John M. Keynes. We argue that Kalecki's ideas (and empirical support for them) are necessary for Keynes's arguments regarding the determination of the level of effective demand. Kalecki's theory of the role of finance i investment also provides a fuller understanding of the importance of liquidity concerns for Keynesian theory and connects the theory of effective demand to the logic of capitalism.
    BibTeX:
    @article{lopez99,
      author = {Julio López and Tracy Mott},
      title = {Kalecki Versus Keynes on the Determinants of Investment},
      journal = {Review of Political Economy},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {11},
      number = {3},
      pages = {291-301},
      note = {This issue of RPE is abot Kalecki. See other papers too.}
    }
    
    Larner, W. The legacy of the social: Market governance and the consumer 1997 Economy and Society
    Vol. 26(3), pp. 373-399 
    article  
    Review: [373] market governance is usually portrayed by advocates as apolitical. The market is cast as being driven by impersonal imperatives such as demand and supply, and as involving technical proglems for planners and managers. In contrast, I claim that market relations are relations of governance in that they are attempts both to constitute and fundamentally to transform the subject's capacity to act. As such, market governance involves new forms of political power premised on the mobilization of particular identities. In this paper I focus my attention specifically on the consumer--sometimes known as the user or customer....
    BibTeX:
    @article{larner:97,
      author = {Wendy Larner},
      title = {The legacy of the social: Market governance and the consumer},
      journal = {Economy and Society},
      year = {1997},
      volume = {26},
      number = {3},
      pages = {373-399}
    }
    
    Lavoie, M. Introduction to Post-Keynesian Economics 2006   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{lavoie06b,
      author = {Marc Lavoie},
      title = {Introduction to Post-Keynesian Economics},
      publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
      year = {2006}
    }
    
    Lavoie, M. Foundations of Post-Keynesian Economic Analysis 1992   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{lavoie92,
      author = {Lavoie, Marc},
      title = {Foundations of Post-Keynesian Economic Analysis},
      publisher = {Edward Elgar},
      year = {1992}
    }
    
    Lazonick, W. & O'Sullivan, M. Maximizing Shareholder Value: A new ideology for corporate governance 2000 Economy and Society
    Vol. 29(1), pp. 13-35 
    article  
    Review: [32] For the first time in US history, the returns to the savings of American households are directly dependent on the sustainability of high yields on corporate stock. What will happen to US consumption, and to the US (and world) economy, if the US stock market shoudl turn down, and stay down?
    BibTeX:
    @article{lazonick-osullivan:00,
      author = {William Lazonick and Mary O'Sullivan},
      title = {Maximizing Shareholder Value: A new ideology for corporate governance},
      journal = {Economy and Society},
      year = {2000},
      volume = {29},
      number = {1},
      pages = {13-35}
    }
    
    Lee, F.S. Post Keynesian Economics (1930-2000): An Emerging Heterodox Economic Theory of Capitalism 2002 Understanding Capitalism  incollection  
    BibTeX:
    @incollection{lee02b,
      author = {Frederic S. Lee},
      title = {Post Keynesian Economics (1930-2000): An Emerging Heterodox Economic Theory of Capitalism},
      booktitle = {Understanding Capitalism},
      publisher = {Pluto Press},
      year = {2002}
    }
    
    Lee, F.S. Heterodox Economics 2008 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economic  incollection  
    Review: Because their economics involves issues of ethical values and social philosophy and the historical aspects of
    human existence, heterodox economists make ethically based economic policy recommendations to improve
    human dignity, that is, recommending ameliorative and/or radical, social and economic policies to improve
    the social provisioning and hence well-being for all members of society and especially the disadvantaged
    members. To do this properly, their economic policy recommendations must be connected to heterodox
    theory which provides an accurate historical and theoretical picture of how the economy actually works - a
    picture that includes class and hierarchical domination, inequalities, and social-economic discontent.

    heterodox economists extend their theory to examining
    issues associated with the process of social provisioning, such as racism, gender and ideologies and myths.
    Because their economics involves issues of ethical values and social philosophy and the historical aspects of
    human existence, heterodox economists make ethically based economic policy recommendations to improve
    human dignity, that is, recommending ameliorative and/or radical, social and economic policies to improve
    the social provisioning and hence well-being for all members of society and especially the disadvantaged
    members. To do this properly, their economic policy recommendations must be connected to heterodox
    theory which provides an accurate historical and theoretical picture of how the economy actually works -- a
    picture that includes class and hierarchical domination, inequalities, and social-economic discontent.

    O'Hara (2002, p. 611):
    The main thing that social economists bring to the study [of heterodox economics] is an
    emphasis on ethics, morals and justice situated in an institutional setting. Institutionalists bring a
    pragmatic approach with a series of concepts of change and normative theory of progress, along
    with a commitment to policy. Marxists bring a set of theories of class and the economic surplus.
    Feminists bring a holistic account of the ongoing relationships between gender, class and
    ethnicity in a context of difference ...And post-Keynesians contribute through an analysis of
    institutions set in real time, with the emphasis on effective demand, uncertainty and a monetary
    theory of production linked closely with policy recommendations.

    The core theoretical elements generate a three-component structure-organization-agency economic theory

    BibTeX:
    @incollection{lee08b,
      author = {Lee, Frederic S.},
      title = {Heterodox Economics},
      booktitle = {The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economic},
      publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
      year = {2008},
      edition = {Second}
    }
    
    Lee, F.S. Alfred Eichner's missing ``Complete Model'': A Heterodox Micro-Macro Model of a Monetary Production Economy 2010 Money and macrodynamics: Alfred Eichner and post-Keynesian economics, pp. 22-42  incollection  
    BibTeX:
    @incollection{lee10a,
      author = {Frederic S. Lee},
      title = {Alfred Eichner's missing ``Complete Model'': A Heterodox Micro-Macro Model of a Monetary Production Economy},
      booktitle = {Money and macrodynamics: Alfred Eichner and post-Keynesian economics},
      publisher = {M.E. Sharpe},
      year = {2010},
      pages = {22-42}
    }
    
    Lee, F.S. The economics of the Industrial Workers of the World: Job control and revolution 2009 Radical Economics and Labor: Essays inspired by the IWW Centennial, pp. 55-77  incollection  
    Review: The micro-macro model of monetary production economy (that appears in Lee 2007, Lee 2010, etc).

    In this chapter, Lee finds implications for job control and labor movement.

    Conclusion:
    ``Marxian theory and its labor theory of value and heterodox theory and its micro-macro model of the economy identify the social relationship that underpin capitalism and the key decisions and variables that control and direct the economy. In addition, both support the tactic of direct action to increase job control and to bring about a general strike that would usher in socialism. However, because the theoretical weakenesses of the labor theory of value are well established, it appears that direct action tactics of job control and the general strike might be inappropriate for bringing about socialism. Thus, a different theoretical approach, heterodox theory, is introduced and delineated. It shows that the theory and its micro-macro model of the economy is capable of providing a radical understanding of wage slavery similar to Marxism (but without the contradictions) and supporting job control and revolution to bring about socialism. In particular, heterodox theory and its model identifies job control and the key decisions and their variables that workers must take control of before socialism can be achieved. So with a heterodox theory underpinning, the IWW can continue to advocate direction action for job control and the general strike to bring about the demise of capitalism and the flowering of socialism." (73)

    BibTeX:
    @incollection{lee09b,
      author = {Frederic S. Lee},
      title = {The economics of the Industrial Workers of the World: Job control and revolution},
      booktitle = {Radical Economics and Labor: Essays inspired by the IWW Centennial},
      publisher = {Routledge},
      year = {2009},
      pages = {55-77}
    }
    
    Lee, F.S. Pricing and the Business Enterprise 1996 Political Economy for the 21st Century: Contemporary Views on the Trend of Economics, pp. 87-102  incollection  
    BibTeX:
    @incollection{lee96b,
      author = {Lee, Frederic S.},
      title = {Pricing and the Business Enterprise},
      booktitle = {Political Economy for the 21st Century: Contemporary Views on the Trend of Economics},
      publisher = {M.E. Sharpe},
      year = {1996},
      pages = {87-102}
    }
    
    Lee, F.S. A heterodox teaching of neoclassical microeconomic theory 2010 International Journal of Economics and Education
    Vol. 1(3), pp. 203-235 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{lee:10c,
      author = {Frederic S. Lee},
      title = {A heterodox teaching of neoclassical microeconomic theory},
      journal = {International Journal of Economics and Education},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {1},
      number = {3},
      pages = {203-235}
    }
    
    Lee, F.S. Teaching Heterodox Microeconomics 2005 post-autistic economics review
    Vol. 31, pp. 26-39 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{lee05a,
      author = {Lee, Frederic S.},
      title = {Teaching Heterodox Microeconomics},
      journal = {post-autistic economics review},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {31},
      pages = {26-39}
    }
    
    Lee, F.S. Theory Creation and the Methodological Foundation of Post Keynesian Economics 2002 Cambridge Journal of Economics
    Vol. 26, pp. 789-804 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{lee02,
      author = {Lee, Frederic S.},
      title = {Theory Creation and the Methodological Foundation of Post Keynesian Economics},
      journal = {Cambridge Journal of Economics},
      year = {2002},
      volume = {26},
      pages = {789-804}
    }
    
    Lee, F.S. Post Keynesian Price Theory 1998   book  
    Review: Eichner's oligopolistic pricing

    Lee (1998, 181-184)

    The profit mark up on SATC ($rSATC$) is equal to ACL (average corporate levy) in Eichner's model.

    Assumtpions in the model
    - the existence of oligopolistic sector, megacorp price leader maximizing the growth of sales (over time)
    - stable and growing market sales
    - primacy of internal financing
    - TRR pricing: profit mark up on SATC, where SATC includes dividends and interst payments, but it excludes depreciation. Thus $rSATC$ is intended to cover depreciation plus profit. $rSATC = ACL = retained earning necessary for generating following investment targeted$

    Pricing mechanism
    - ``The change in the mark up. Eichner argued, was the function of demand for additional fiannce over time required for the additional investment, subject to the marginal investment plan generating a minimally satisfactory rate of return; the supply of internal fund over time generated by the increased mark up tempered by the substitution effect, threat of entry, and government intervention; the market rate of interest; and the implicit interest rate on the additional investment funds generated internally throough an increase in the mark up." (183)

    BibTeX:
    @book{lee98,
      author = {Lee, Frederic S.},
      title = {Post Keynesian Price Theory},
      publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
      year = {1998}
    }
    
    Lee, F.S. Pricing, the Pricing model and Post-Keynesian Price Theory 1996 Review of Political Economy
    Vol. 8(1), pp. 87-99 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{lee96a,
      author = {Lee, Frederic S.},
      title = {Pricing, the Pricing model and Post-Keynesian Price Theory},
      journal = {Review of Political Economy},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {8},
      number = {1},
      pages = {87-99}
    }
    
    Lee, F.S. From Post Keynesian to Historical Price Theory, Part 1: Facts, Theory and Empirically Grounded Pricing Model 1994 Review of Political Economy
    Vol. 6(3), pp. 303-336 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{lee94,
      author = {Lee, Frederic S.},
      title = {From Post Keynesian to Historical Price Theory, Part 1: Facts, Theory and Empirically Grounded Pricing Model},
      journal = {Review of Political Economy},
      year = {1994},
      volume = {6},
      number = {3},
      pages = {303-336}
    }
    
    Lee, F.S. Post Keynesian View of Average Direct Costs: A Critical Evaluation of the Theory and the Empirical Evidence 1986 Journal of Post Keynesian Economics
    Vol. 8(3), pp. 400-424 
    article  
    Review: Lee rejects constnat ADC argued by Post Keynesians.
    BibTeX:
    @article{lee86,
      author = {Lee, Frederic S.},
      title = {Post Keynesian View of Average Direct Costs: A Critical Evaluation of the Theory and the Empirical Evidence},
      journal = {Journal of Post Keynesian Economics},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {8},
      number = {3},
      pages = {400-424}
    }
    
    Lee, F.S. Full Cost prices, classical price theory, and long period method analysis: a critical evaluation 1985 Metroeconomica
    Vol. XXXVII, pp. 199-219 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{lee85,
      author = {Lee, Frederic S.},
      title = {Full Cost prices, classical price theory, and long period method analysis: a critical evaluation},
      journal = {Metroeconomica},
      year = {1985},
      volume = {XXXVII},
      pages = {199-219}
    }
    
    Lee, F.S. The Oxford Challenge to Marshallian Supply and Demand: The history of the Oxford Economists' Research Group 1981 Oxford Economic Papers
    Vol. 33(3), pp. 339-351 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{lee81,
      author = {Frederic S. Lee},
      title = {The Oxford Challenge to Marshallian Supply and Demand: The history of the Oxford Economists' Research Group},
      journal = {Oxford Economic Papers},
      year = {1981},
      volume = {33},
      number = {3},
      pages = {339-351}
    }
    
    Lee, F.S. The Oxford Challenge to Marshallian Supply and Demand: The history of the Oxford Economists' Research Group 1981 Oxford Economic Papers
    Vol. 33(3), pp. 339-351 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{lee:81,
      author = {Frederic S. Lee},
      title = {The Oxford Challenge to Marshallian Supply and Demand: The history of the Oxford Economists' Research Group},
      journal = {Oxford Economic Papers},
      year = {1981},
      volume = {33},
      number = {3},
      pages = {339-351}
    }
    
    Lee, F.S. & Downward, P. Restesting Gardiner Means's Evidence on Administered Prices 1999 Journal of Economic Issues
    Vol. 33(4), pp. 861-886 
    article  
    Review: Gardiner Means developed his doctrine of administered prices in the 1930s within the context of a specific conception of the American economy [Means 1935, 1939; Lee 1998]. He was concerned with drawing on empirical data of all sorts to identify and describe the causal mechanisms underlying pricing behavior in the corporate economy. The most important of the mechanisms, known as the administered price thesis, was the coordination and organization of economic activity through the interplay of administrative control and the market. The thesis stated that in markets where enterprises exercised administrative control over prices, prices would remain constant for a series of transactions and for a period of time; whereas in markets where administrative control was absent, prices were determined coincidentally with the market transaction and hence would vary with each transaction. As a result, the behavior of administered prices and market prices were, under cyclical business conditions, quite different. That is, m arket prices declined relative to administered prices when demand declined and rose relative to administered prices when demand increased; over the business cycle, there were no changes in the absolute prices of both groups or in the relative prices between the two groups. In addition, the behavior of production relative to administered and market prices was also quite different. When business activity declined, the outcome in administered-price markets was that prices declined relatively little compared to production declines, whereas in market-price markets, prices declined significantly relative to production declines; and the reverse was the case when business activity increased. Finally, the basis of administered control over prices was in part grounded in the degree of market concentration and not at all grounded in product characteristics. In short, with his administered price thesis, Means developed a non-Keynesian explanation of the Great Depression and, more generally, of the degree to which resourc es were used in the economy [Lee 1990, 1994, 1998].

    The empirical claims made by Means were quickly subjected to statistical tests. Means's claims were rejected by Jules Backman [1939a, 1939b, 1940], Stephen DuBrul [1939], Don Humphrey [1937], Edward Mason [1938], and Rufus Tucker [1938a, 1938b, 1940]. In contrast, John Blair [1955, 1956] felt that Means's empirical claims were generally sound, especially concerning the relationship between prices and concentration. In general, institutionalists and Post Keynesians have either uncritically accepted Means's claims or simply ignored them. In this article, we readdress Means's results more formally using econometric testing to help evaluate his administered price thesis. We are well aware that both institutionalists and Post Keynesians are suspicious of the econometric method. We would argue that in an open historical system, wherein causal mechanisms reveal themselves partially as demi-regularities [Lawson 1997], econometrics can be used to help assess knowledge claims in connection with other, more qualitative " insights [see, for example, Downward 1998, 1999]. From this perspective, we take this opportunity to undertake a critical examination of the causal mechanisms determining price behavior in corporate capitalism and to examine Means's non-Keynesian explanation of resource use in the economy.
    In particular, econometrics will be used re-test the empirical claims Means made to underpin and support his concepts of administered and market prices as well as their movement over the business cycle, and their relationship to production, product characteristics, and concentration. [1] Consequently, the actual empirical data Means used to ground the thesis and its relationships are the focal point of the tests. The first section will review the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) price data Means used to establish the existence of administered and market prices based on the frequency of price change. The second section of the article will concentrate on delineating and retesting the empirical arguments Means used to ground the relationship of the magnitude of price change of market and administered prices over the business cycle. The third section will concentrate on delineating and retesting the empirical arguments used to ground the relationship of the magnitude of price change to variations in production. The fourth section will examine the empirical arguments Means marshalled to support his view that the administrative control of prices, as represented by the frequency of price change, was grounded in the size of the business enterprise and on the degree of absolute and market concentration and not based on product characteristics. The article concludes that since some of Means's claims are supported by the data econometrically while others are, not, his work on administered prices has to be reassessed ...

    BibTeX:
    @article{lee-downward:99,
      author = {Frederic S. Lee and Paul Downward},
      title = {Restesting Gardiner Means's Evidence on Administered Prices},
      journal = {Journal of Economic Issues},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {33},
      number = {4},
      pages = {861-886}
    }
    
    Lee, F.S. & Jo, T.-H. Social Surplus Approach and Heterodox Economics 2011   workingpaper  
    BibTeX:
    @workingpaper{lee-jo:11a,
      author = {Frederic S. Lee and Tae-Hee Jo},
      title = {Social Surplus Approach and Heterodox Economics},
      year = {2011},
      note = {Paper presented at the Allied Social Science Associtation annual meeting, Denver, CO, USA. January 6-9, 2011.}
    }
    
    Lee, F.S. & Jo, T.-H. Heterodox Production and Cost Theory of the Business Enterprise 2010   techreport  
    BibTeX:
    @techreport{lee-jo:10a,
      author = {Frederic S. Lee and Tae-Hee Jo},
      title = {Heterodox Production and Cost Theory of the Business Enterprise},
      year = {2010},
      note = {Earlier draft was presented at the 4th Bi-Annual Cross-Border Post Keyensian Conference, October 2009, Buffalo, NY}
    }
    
    Lee, F.S. & Keen, S. The Incoherent Emperor: A Heterodox Critique of Neoclassical Microeconomic Theory 2004 Review of Social Economy
    Vol. 62(2), pp. 169-199 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{lee04,
      author = {Lee, Frederic S. and Keen, S.},
      title = {The Incoherent Emperor: A Heterodox Critique of Neoclassical Microeconomic Theory},
      journal = {Review of Social Economy},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {62},
      number = {2},
      pages = {169-199}
    }
    
    Lutz, M.A. Economics for the Common Good: Two Centuries of Social Economic Thought in the Humanistic Tradition 1999   book  
    Review: Ch.5 Ethics, Science and economic welfare.

    The classical approach to welfare. The utilitarian theory of welfare. New Wefare Theory by neoclassical economics.

    Critiques of neoclassical welfare theory.

    The value-judgement is unavoidable in dealing with welfare and policy. Especially, critiques of new welfare theory from a philosophical and methodological point of view. The need for social welfare theory from a humanistic point of view. See articles and books cited in this chapter; such as, S. Roy's Philosophy of Economics (1991) and S, Nath's A Reappraisal of Welfare Economics (1976).

    BibTeX:
    @book{lutz99,
      author = {Mark A. Lutz},
      title = {Economics for the Common Good: Two Centuries of Social Economic Thought in the Humanistic Tradition},
      publisher = {Routledge},
      year = {1999}
    }
    
    Marcuzzo, M.C. Alternative Microeconomic Foundations for Macroeconomics: the controversy over the L-shaped cost curve revisited 1996 Review of Political Economy
    Vol. 8(1), pp. 7-22 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{marcuzzo96,
      author = {Maria Cristina Marcuzzo},
      title = {Alternative Microeconomic Foundations for Macroeconomics: the controversy over the L-shaped cost curve revisited},
      journal = {Review of Political Economy},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {8},
      number = {1},
      pages = {7-22}
    }
    
    Matthaei, J. Rethinking Scarcity: Neoclasscism, NeoMalthusianism, and NeoMarxism 1984 Review of Radical Political Economics
    Vol. 16(2/3), pp. 81-94 
    article  
    Review: ``Capitalist production does not find its limit in nature's scarcity, but rather in the internal contradictions of capital accumulation.'' (90)

    ``One would think that the clear underutilization of these productive resources would overturn the notion that scarce resources are the problem. Instead, when this problem could not no longer be ignored by mainstream economists, its study was relegated to a new discourse, that of macroeconomics. Neatly compartmentalized, the ``Keynesian Revolution'' left the microfoundations of neclassical theory intact; the primacy of scarcity and the resulting focus on choice and allocation have remained unchallenged.'' (90)

    BibTeX:
    @article{matthaei84,
      author = {Julie Matthaei},
      title = {Rethinking Scarcity: Neoclasscism, NeoMalthusianism, and NeoMarxism},
      journal = {Review of Radical Political Economics},
      year = {1984},
      volume = {16},
      number = {2/3},
      pages = {81-94}
    }
    
    McDermott, J. Economics in Real Time: A Theoretical Reconstruction 2003   book  
    Review: ``Duration of time alone introduces a degree of inequality into the [sale/purchase] relationship''. (3) ``prices are not in principle fully comparable, having only a possibly situational comparabilty" (3) ``with respect to the microeconomics of sale/purchase-in-time, classical and neoclassical microeconomics correspond to the subcase when t=0, a subcae in which all concrete relationships between producer/seller and purchaser/consumer are abstracted away, its virtues as an explanatory apparatus stemming logically from its tradeoff between fully abstract generality and time. But from the analytical point of view the familiar instantaneous microeconomcis can be consistently maintained only as a boundary (analogous to a mathematical limit) of possible economc behavior" (3)
    BibTeX:
    @book{mcdermott03,
      author = {John McDermott},
      title = {Economics in Real Time: A Theoretical Reconstruction},
      publisher = {The University of Michigan Press},
      year = {2003}
    }
    
    Melmies, J. New-Keynesians Versus Post-Keynesians on the Theory of Prices 2010 Journal of Post Keynesian Economics
    Vol. 32(3), pp. 445-466 
    article URL 
    Review: NK economics: ``Instead of rejecting the theory on the basis of the weakness of its microeconomic foundation, they tried to derive price rigidity from agents' rational behaviour: New Keynesian economics were born" (3) ``in Keynes's theory, prices can be flexible or rigid. Their rigidity plays no role in effective demand effects but for a purpose of realism, we choose to analyze prices which repond slowly to demand because it is what is observed" (12) J. Robinson: ``despite what Keynes said himself, the Keynesian revolution in theory of prices is fare more important than in the theory of employment" (Robinson and Wilkinson, 1985, ``Ideology and Logic'', in Vicarelli. F. ed., Keynes's Relevance Today, 1985, Palgrave MacMillan.) A question to New Keynesians: ``why should price stickiness be only an undesired feature for firms?''. ``why the hell do firms post prices on tags and menus if doing so is such a constraint for their optimal plans?" (17) PK answer: ``firms want ``stable'' prices'' (13) ``it is not because prices are printed on menus that they don't change, it is because firms want to keep prices stable that they can sell products on catalogues and menus" (17) Stablit is different from rigidity. Redidity does not imply stability, stability implies some kind of regidity. >> i think the difference comes from the conception of active agency. ``In a non-ergodic world with non-Walrasian markets, firms have to define policies, such as investment policies, employment policies and pricing policies. Policies are the answer to uncertainty" (14) The firm as a margin-maker rather than a price maker in the monopolistic market. ``In New-Keynesian economics, firms don't have pricing policies at all" (14) ``sequential transactions marke the marekt rather than markets make transactions" (14) ``If we assume, in a Post-Keynesian view, that firm use some kind of cost-plus pricing and that the main reason of increasing prices is an increase in costs, this means that rigidity comes from profit margins more than from prices" (16)
    BibTeX:
    @article{melmies:10,
      author = {Jordan Melmies},
      title = {New-Keynesians Versus Post-Keynesians on the Theory of Prices},
      journal = {Journal of Post Keynesian Economics},
      year = {2010},
      volume = {32},
      number = {3},
      pages = {445-466},
      url = {http://www.boeckler.de/33_91949.html}
    }
    
    Meyer, P.B. The Corporate Person and Social Control: Responding to Deregulation 1986 Review of Radical Political Economics
    Vol. 18(3), pp. 65-84 
    article  
    Review: [67] This history [of regulation in the US] can be characterzed as responses to flaws in the capitalist system, designed to protect business and strengthen the system more than to control the depredations of private firms.

    [67] the regulations imposed on businesses i nthe United States hgave reponded to recognition of, or stark evidence of, ``market failues,'' [sic] which needed to be corrected for the good of the capitalist system as a whole.

    [67] Any chronology of regulation provides evidence of the pattern of response to crisis and the need for system stabilization. Monopolies came under control when they adversely affected too many other businesses. Food production came under some regulation following disclosures about conditions in the stockyards of Chicago; banking and secruties controls emerged from the Depression, and labor law, which controlled corporate actions at the same time as it legitimated labor organizing, was a resonse to an emerging trend which the system had to acknowledge and integrate.

    [67] Even the ``social control'' of the sixties and seventies can be interpreted as serving business interests. [see examples that follow]

    [69] (1) the [financial/monetary] sanctions available appear to be inadequate for systematic deterrence, and, (2) ... the maximum sanctions available, inadequate as they are, are very rarely employed. Regulatory enforcement sanctions, thus, appea virtually irrelevant as a cost to businesses.

    [69] To the extent that regulations actually improve the working of capitalist markets or act to stabilize the system as a whole, through controlling conflicts or providing legitamay, it is not surprising that most firms, generally, comply with regulations. The costs associated with complieance are their share of the costs of maintenance of capitalism's legitimation or of the costs of control of markets or competition they would rather avoid.

    [69- 71] Traditionalists, restrictivists, populists, and Radicals on regulations.

    [73] we need to identify a source of corporate vulnerability which enables a decentralized approach to replace reliance on the centralized state, which, interntinally or not, has proven itself to be ineffective in controlling corporate behavior.

    [73] The corporation is a legal creature of the state... have had effective Constitutional parity with human males.

    [77] there are communities which are vulnerable to the effects of capital mobility.

    [77] Given the fact that consumers, workers, and communities [innocent victims] are most readiliy victimized by the types of sanctions available today.

    BibTeX:
    @article{meyer86,
      author = {Peter B. Meyer},
      title = {The Corporate Person and Social Control: Responding to Deregulation},
      journal = {Review of Radical Political Economics},
      year = {1986},
      volume = {18},
      number = {3},
      pages = {65-84}
    }
    
    Migone, A. Consumerism: Patterns of Consumption in Contemporary Capitalism 2007 Review of Radical Political Economics
    Vol. 39(2), pp. 173-200 
    article  
    Review: Two accumulation regimes in the capitalist system.

    See Table 1.

    1. bf Fordism: after WWII and 1960s. The system is sustained by mass production, high consumption, and high living wage. Keynesian welfare state to sustain the regime. Affluent society in terms of the provision of physical goods, economic growth. Such a society is relatively stable. Some called this period as the `golden age' of capitalism.

    2. bf Post-Fordism: as of 1970s. Stagflation and the counter attack on the welfare State by conservative economists (the Chicago school) and policy makers. The emergence of neoliberalism---flexibilization in the labor relations, privatization of public enterprises, and financialization and globalization. Batch production and differentiated products.

    This system is sustained by `hedonistic consumerism'--consumption by the higher income class due to persistent increase in income for the higher class and to persistent decrease in income for lower income classes. Increasingly and negatively skewed income distribution. Those lower income classes with unstable job security and declining real money wage have been forced to finance their basic consumption (health care, education, and housing) through debts.

    The financial sector, as a result, has been growing tremendously by creating more money through the financial system.

    bf Unbalance 1: manufacturing (or real) sector and financial (or monetary) sector: decreasing profit rates in the former and increasing profit rates in the latter. The latter rules the roost especially in the advanced capitalist economy like the U.S. bf Unbalance

    2: high income class and lower income class. Increasing income inequality. At the aggregate level, consumption has been increasing. This is mainly due to the increase in consumption by the high income class. ``[L]evels of consumption are maximized by creating the conditions for affluent consumption among the richest part of society and by compressing income shares for the rest of society'' (192) bf Hedonistic consumerism is intensified by the efforts of the business enterprise---increasing advertisement expenditure and creating goods/services which induce `hedonistic' consumption. Needs are constructed or manufactured (see p. 183).

    This point is also extensively explored by John Kenneth Galbraith (1967), The New Industrial State. This also points to Veblen's concept of conspicuous consumption in the sense that in the capitalist economy and under its prevailing culture (pecuniary business principles), the consumption of behavior is formed in favor of the business principles, not in favor of public principles. Consumption is determined in the cultural context of a particular capitalist economy.

    And such a tendency is also sustained by the State welfare expenditure---majority of welfare benefits which go to the lower income class are spent on basic needs (foods, health care, and education). Thus expenditures on basic goods render private enterprises keep producing and reproducing themselves. In this regard, the role of the State is essential to maintain the system---it is good for the private enterprises.

    The State, in effect, does not significantly improve the welfare of the general public, rather the State helps private enterprises to reproduce (that is, maintain the present accumulation regime). Hence, the author argues that ``we reassess the role of the State within the democratic framework. It is necessary to assign the State the critical role of empowering the voices of those who are marginalized and disadvantaged. Its role, unlike what neoliberal theorists argue, should be to protect those who cannot protect themselves '' (194).

    BibTeX:
    @article{migone07,
      author = {Andrea Migone},
      title = {Consumerism: Patterns of Consumption in Contemporary Capitalism},
      journal = {Review of Radical Political Economics},
      year = {2007},
      volume = {39},
      number = {2},
      pages = {173-200}
    }
    
    Miller, E.S. Economic Regulation and New Technology in the Telecommunications Industry 1996 Journal of Economic Issues
    Vol. 30(3), pp. 719-733 
    article  
    Review: ``institutional economics apprehends marekt power as a persistent phenomenon of economic life and perceives its control as imperative. This clash of visions [NC vs. Institutionalist] is in large measure responsible for conflicts about the need for social control and the link between economic regulation and technological change'' (720)

    [In constrast to NC beliefs] ``technical progress is neither inhibited nor encouraged by regulation, or any institutional design, but rather by the human proclivity for inquiry, and that economic power is not a function of the leve lof technological advance. I argue that control of market power is essential to ensure optimal social results'' (720) [what is optimal social results?]

    ``A large number, if not indeed most, of the ``disintrested'' professionals who in effect plead the industry case in various forums are or have been associated with the industry in one or another paid capacity... the analysis is higly ideological'' (731).

    BibTeX:
    @article{miller96,
      author = {Ehythe S. Miller},
      title = {Economic Regulation and New Technology in the Telecommunications Industry},
      journal = {Journal of Economic Issues},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {30},
      number = {3},
      pages = {719-733}
    }
    
    Morroni, M. Production Process and Technical Change 1992   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{morroni:92,
      author = {Mario Morroni},
      title = {Production Process and Technical Change},
      publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
      year = {1992}
    }
    
    Moss, S. An Economic Theory of Business Strategy: An Essay in Dynamics without Equilibrium 1981   book  
    Review: Ch.3. Economic determinants of investment strategies ``The process of invention is the application of non-specific knowledge to specific objectives'' (47) ``there are no unique and independent roles for knowledge or for objectives which characterize all invention and innovation'' (47) Knowledge not always leads to innovation. Schumpeterian evolutionary process---invention, innovation, and immitation---lacks historical accuracy. Moss provides historical exmaples how some innonvations were initiated and developed for commercial and inudstrial use. ``To argue that invention is different from innovation is to argue that one individual is concerned with the knowledge (the inventor) and another is concerned with objective (the innovator), and that somewhere in the application of knowledge to objective we pass from invention to innovation'' (49) ``invention and innovation are best treated as a single process which can, but need not, entail some division of labour'' (49) ``invention requires a greater conceptual leap than imitation and that innovation involves greater costs and riks'' (50) The investment for expansion and the investment for diversification. (52) Investment is enterprise specific---reousrce and organizations. ``Firms do not face God-given lists of potential investment projects'' (53) Theory of investment concentrates on various measures of the rates of return on an invetment project rather than on the resoucres of the firm. ... resources of which a firm is composed---including its excess capacities---have a significant effect on the rates of return from various investment projects (56) Identification --- evaluation --- choice ``both the knowledge to be employed in any investment project and the objectives to be sought will be determined by the resources of the firm and the services rendered by those resources, including the `business connection' of the firm'' (57) ``The activities of invention, innovation and imitation are normal business activities'' (59) Market forces in conjuction with resoucre constraints. ``Successful business activity renders the constraints under which the firm operates endogenous. The point is not that the managers of the firm choose which constraints shall be binding but ratehr which constraints shall cease to be binding'' (65)
    BibTeX:
    @book{moss81,
      author = {Scott Moss},
      title = {An Economic Theory of Business Strategy: An Essay in Dynamics without Equilibrium},
      publisher = {John Wiley and Sons},
      year = {1981}
    }
    
    Mott, T. In What Sense Does Monopoly Capital Require Monopoly? An Essay on the Contribution of Kalecki and Steindl 1992 The Economic Surplus in Advanced Economies, pp. 114-129  incollection  
    Review: the monopoly capital theory in contrast to New Keynesian account of imperfect competition and the lack of effective demand
    BibTeX:
    @incollection{mott92,
      author = {Mott, Tracy},
      title = {In What Sense Does Monopoly Capital Require Monopoly? An Essay on the Contribution of Kalecki and Steindl},
      booktitle = {The Economic Surplus in Advanced Economies},
      publisher = {Edward Elgar},
      year = {1992},
      pages = {114-129}
    }
    
    Moudud, J.K. & Zacharias, A. Whither the Welfare State? 2000 Public Policy Brief(No. 61)  techreport  
    Review: The welfare state: governments' efforts to maintain a instiutitional structure and expenditure on the social safety net.

    ``We argue that because investment is financed primarily out of business retained earnings (rather than household saving), policies that stimulates investment may not conflict with the maintenance of a robust welfare state.'' (1) -- it is (pk) micro view. Not many pk macroeconomists put an emphasis on the reatained earning as a primary source of investment.

    Authors' suggestion: to stimulate investment, lower taxes on business income and higher taxes on the personal income of uppoer-income households and certain types of financial market transactions. -- Harrod, Shaikh (1992), and Moudud (1999)

    Anwar Shaikh (1992), ``A Dynamic Apporach to the Theory of Effective Demand.'' in D. Papadimitriou, ed., Profits, Deficits and Instability, London: Macmillan.

    BibTeX:
    @techreport{moudud00,
      author = {Jamee K. Moudud and Ajit Zacharias},
      title = {Whither the Welfare State?},
      journal = {Public Policy Brief},
      year = {2000},
      number = {No. 61}
    }
    
    Nichols, M., Pavlov, O. & Radzicki, M.J. The Circular and Cumulative Structure of Administered Pricing 2006 Journal of Economic Issues
    Vol. XL(2), pp. 517-526 
    article  
    Review: not much insight in it.
    BibTeX:
    @article{nicholsetal06,
      author = {Mark Nichols and Oleg Pavlov and Michael J. Radzicki},
      title = {The Circular and Cumulative Structure of Administered Pricing},
      journal = {Journal of Economic Issues},
      year = {2006},
      volume = {XL},
      number = {2},
      pages = {517-526}
    }
    
    Pasinetti, L.L. From Pure Theory to Full Economic Analysis--A Place for the Economic Agent 2005 Cachiers d'économie politique
    Vol. 2(49), pp. 211-216 
    article  
    Review: [212] by ``pure theory'', I mean an excercise of abstraction aimed at singling out those elements of reality that have a high degree of persistence ( i.e. of invariance) through time. Human behaviour does not share this characteristic and hence should not be part of this first state of economic investigation. Human beings are intrinsically endowed with discretion of action and enjoy many degrees of freedom of behaviour on this respect. The numberous alternative ways in which economists of different schools, in different epochs, and from different countries, have envisaged the behaviour of the economic agentare just a confirmation of this statement. Human beings know ``more than one way to skin the cat'', and they are ready to use them all. But these varieties of human behaviour, while representing the joy of poets and novelists, become the crux of scientists, who aim at theories that must start from empiricially sold assumptions. To put the matter in a different way: the economic agent suffers from (or, in fact we should better say, enjoy) so many degrees of freedome that we are undable to affirm with certainty which specific kind of behaviour is unquestionably the relevant one, for any time and for any space. Yet this would be precisely the minimum requirement for having a consistent and rigorous theory.

    [213] [Full economic analysis--two stage-approach]

    A first stage of investigation, embedded in pure economic theory, deals with those elements that are persistent, and consistent with those series of characteristics and relations of the economic system under scrutiny, which are quire independent of particular kinds of human behaviour.

    A second stage of investigation, mainly concerning institutional analysis, delas with various hypotheses on individual and social behaviour, and consequently introduces different (and sometimes alternative) institutional set-ups, within which human beings organize themselves.

    [214] [Pasinettis's and Sraffian macrofoundations -- not that many Sraffians reject the micro-macro dichotom by concentrating exclusively on the macro domain]

    There are forces in the economic system, which owe their presence and their relations not to specific, individual and/or social, types of behaviour, but are in fact consistent with many alternative patterns of behaviour. As a result, the macro-foundations of the economic systems appear to have unambiguous advantages---among others, that of being compatible with different and varied ``micro-foundations.'' [Pasinetti finds the root of macrofoundations in the classical political economy. And such is the foundation of the long-period surplus approach]

    BibTeX:
    @article{pasinetti:05b,
      author = {Luigi L. Pasinetti},
      title = {From Pure Theory to Full Economic Analysis--A Place for the Economic Agent},
      journal = {Cachiers d'économie politique},
      year = {2005},
      volume = {2},
      number = {49},
      pages = {211-216}
    }
    
    Pasinetti, L.L. Lectures on the Theory of Production 1977   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{pasinetti:77,
      author = {Luigi L. Pasinetti},
      title = {Lectures on the Theory of Production},
      publisher = {Columbia University Press},
      year = {1977}
    }
    
    Penrose, E.T. The Theory of the Growth of the Firm 1959   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{penrose59,
      author = {Edith T. Penrose},
      title = {The Theory of the Growth of the Firm},
      publisher = {Basil Blackwell},
      year = {1959}
    }
    
    Pessali, H. & Fernandez, R. Institutional Economics at the Micro Level? What Transaction Costs Theory Could Learn from Original Institutionalism (In the Spiriit of Building Bridges) 1999 Journal of Economic Issues
    Vol. 33(2), pp. 265-275 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{pessali99,
      author = {Pessali, H. and R. Fernandez},
      title = {Institutional Economics at the Micro Level? What Transaction Costs Theory Could Learn from Original Institutionalism (In the Spiriit of Building Bridges)},
      journal = {Journal of Economic Issues},
      year = {1999},
      volume = {33},
      number = {2},
      pages = {265-275},
      note = {Critiques of transaction cost theory of firms}
    }
    
    Polanyi, K. The Economy as Instituted Process 1968 Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies: Essays of Karl Polanyi, pp. 139-174  incollection  
    Review: Polanyi distinguishes the formal (like Robbins') from the substantive (like Gruchy's) meaning of economic activities. He argues that the former is only applicable to market activities---and it is narrowly defined. But our activities are also organized by non-market activities---convention, rules, norms, values, and culture. Economic activities take place, and thus have meanings, in a social context. According to Polanyi, economy is

    quote
    an instituted process of interaction between man and his environment, which results in a continuous supply of want-satisfyling material means...The human economy, then, is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and non-economic. (p. 145 and 148)
    quote

    BibTeX:
    @incollection{polanyi:68,
      author = {Karl Polanyi},
      title = {The Economy as Instituted Process},
      booktitle = {Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies: Essays of Karl Polanyi},
      publisher = {A Doubleday Anchor Original},
      year = {1968},
      pages = {139-174}
    }
    
    Power, M. Social Provisioning as a Starting Point for Feminist Ecnomics 2004 Feminist Economics
    Vol. 10(3), pp. 3-19 
    article  
    Review: [4-5] Five core methodological starting point. 1. careing labor and domestric labor. 2. human well-being as a measure of economic success. 3. human agency. 4. ethical judgment. 5. class, race-ethnicity, gender, color, caste.

    [6] ``Social provisioning'' is a phrase that draws attention away from images of pecuniary pursuits and individual competition, and towards notions of sustenance, cooperation, and support. Rather than be naturalized or taken as given, capitalist institutions and dynamics become subjects to be examined and critiqued.

    BibTeX:
    @article{power:04,
      author = {Marilyn Power},
      title = {Social Provisioning as a Starting Point for Feminist Ecnomics},
      journal = {Feminist Economics},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {10},
      number = {3},
      pages = {3-19}
    }
    
    Prasch, R.E. How Markets Work: Supply, Demand and the `Real World' 2009   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{prasch09,
      author = {Robert E. Prasch},
      title = {How Markets Work: Supply, Demand and the `Real World'},
      publisher = {Edward Elgar},
      year = {2009}
    }
    
    Prechel, H. Big Business and the State: Historical Transactions and Corporate Transformation, 1880s-1990s 2000   book  
    Review: Ch.7. More political capitalism: 1940-1985 Steel industry. ``the political and economic behavior of this subclass segment did not occur in isolation from the broader capital accumulation process or the state's agendas'' (150)

    BE and the State. 1. the class-unity theory: Miliband, Domhoff. A unified capitalist-class perspective emerges from the policy-formation process. 2. State autonomy theory: Skocpol. The state and its organization is independet of the dynamics of capital accumulation. 3. The class segment theory: Offe, Poulantzas, Aglietta, Baran and Sweezy, Prechel. differential rates of accumulation within the various segments of capital. Monopoly capital. ``business policies do not affect all capitalist class equally'' ``states can only be relatively autonomous from the capitalist class because both are part of the mode of production'' (151; Poulantzas 1978, Levine 1988) `

    `The capitalist class and the capitalist state are dependent on one another to ensure economic stability'' (151).

    ``the key issue is not whether state are autonomous from the capitalist class or class segments but rather the historical conditios under which the state is more or less autonomous'' (152)

    [153] Capital dependence [dependence between the capitalist class and the state]: within the capitalist class and between the captialist class and the state. ``Although capitali dependence always exists between the state and corporations, this dependence is most pronounced during periods of economic downturn. During recessions and depressions the capitalist class unifies behind a business policy favorable to capitalist accumulation in he dominant economic sectors. Capitalist class and subclass segments unify because the state, historically, is the only organization with the authority and power to implement the society-wide policies necessary to overcome economic constraints. ... Their mutual capital dependence increases cooperation among big business and the state to create institutional arrangements that imporove their cash flows or access to capital.

    [154] the state is a complex organization whose structure includes separate large supra-units (i.e., executive, judicial, legislative) and disparate subunits (e.g.,treasury, commerce). The U.S. state is a single organization because the Constitution defines functions of these supra-units as interrelated.

    [167] The back-to-back recession (i.e., 1980, 1981-82) and internationalization of the U.S. economy unified industrial capital...the capitalist class established a political coalition that pressured the fedral government to stiumulate economic growth. the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (RA81): designed to increase capital formation, in part, by creating incentives for personal savings.

    [167-8] It has been estimated that ACRS [Accelerated Cost Recovery System] writes-offs were so generous that profit from new investments were higher after, rather than before taxes.

    [171] when corporations' capital dependence increases, the capitalist class mobilizes politically and moves toward the unified end of the class unity/division coninuum to change state business policy.

    [171] State intervention in the oligopolistic era occurred in the form of capital-generating business policy (e.g., tax credits)

    [173] The policy formation process and the degree to which the state acts autonomously in policy making is contingent on historical variation in corporations' capital dependence, the state's structure, economic conditions and the resulting network of capitalist interests and policitcal alignents.

    BibTeX:
    @book{prechel00,
      author = {Harland Prechel},
      title = {Big Business and the State: Historical Transactions and Corporate Transformation, 1880s-1990s},
      publisher = {State University of New York Press},
      year = {2000}
    }
    
    Reynolds, P.J. Kalecki's Theory of Prices and Distribution 1996 An Alternative Macroeconomics Theory: The Kaleckian Model and Post-Keynesian Economics, pp. 73-91  incollection  
    BibTeX:
    @incollection{reynolds96,
      author = {Reynolds, Peter J.},
      title = {Kalecki's Theory of Prices and Distribution},
      booktitle = {An Alternative Macroeconomics Theory: The Kaleckian Model and Post-Keynesian Economics},
      publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers},
      year = {1996},
      pages = {73-91}
    }
    
    Reynolds, P.J. Political Economy: A Synthesis of Kaleckian and Post Keynesian Economics 1987   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{reynolds87,
      author = {Reynolds, Peter J.},
      title = {Political Economy: A Synthesis of Kaleckian and Post Keynesian Economics},
      publisher = {Wheatsheaf Books},
      year = {1987}
    }
    
    Robinson, J.V. Time in economic theory 1980 Kyklos
    Vol. 33, pp. 219-229 
    article  
    Review: ``But if we are to inroduce decisions into the model, we must introduce time. Decisions are taken in the light of beliefs about their future consequences.'' (222) ``The consequent interaction of individual decisions is seen in the total comosition and prices of the total flow of output and tis distribution between wages and gross profits. This brings about the realisation of surplus value, in Marxian language, or the equalisation of savings with investment, in Keynesian language." (223) ``To construct models that cannot be applied is merely an idle amusement" (224) ``To account for what happened, we should have to enquire what conventions and expectatins were guiding conducts at dates in the period when decisions were taken by firms and households" (227)
    BibTeX:
    @article{robinson80b,
      author = {Robinson, Joan V.},
      title = {Time in economic theory},
      journal = {Kyklos},
      year = {1980},
      volume = {33},
      pages = {219-229}
    }
    
    Robinson, J.V. The Production Function and the Theory of Capital 1953 Review of Economic Studies
    Vol. 15(2), pp. 81-106 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{robinson53,
      author = {Robinson, Joan V.},
      title = {The Production Function and the Theory of Capital},
      journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
      year = {1953},
      volume = {15},
      number = {2},
      pages = {81-106}
    }
    
    Robinson, J.V. What is Perfect Competition? 1934 Quarterly Journal of Economics
    Vol. 49(1), pp. 104-120 
    article  
    Review: Robinson's def of perefect competition: ``a state of affairs in which the demand for the output of an individual seller is perfectly elastic.'' (104)

    two conditions for perfect competition: 1) That the market must be perfect. 2) That the number of firms must be large. (112)

    ``it is impossible to discuss the number of firms required to ensure perfect competition without discussing the marginal cost curves of the firms composing the industry.'' (118)

    ``with given slopes of the marginal cost curves, there is a certain definite number of firms which will produce comeptition of an agreed degree of perfection, and this number, in some cases, may be quite small.'' (120)

    This has nothing to do with free-entry/exit.

    ``The definition of a commoditiy is completely arbitrary, and the definition of a market depends upon the definition of a commodity.'' (113)

    BibTeX:
    @article{robinson34,
      author = {Joan V. Robinson},
      title = {What is Perfect Competition?},
      journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
      year = {1934},
      volume = {49},
      number = {1},
      pages = {104-120}
    }
    
    Robinson, J.V. Economics of Imperfec Competition 1933   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{robinson33,
      author = {Joan V. Robinson},
      title = {Economics of Imperfec Competition},
      publisher = {Macmillan},
      year = {1933}
    }
    
    Roncaglia, A. Sraffa and the Theory of Prices 1978   book  
    Review: Ch. 8 On the Relationshiop between Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities and Marxian Theory

    [131] the ultra-Marxists (those who reject Sraffa) and the ultra-Sraffians (those who reject the LTV, like Samuelson).

    [132-4] Issues around Marx-Sraffa: 1. LTV, 2) labour vs. labour power, 3) technology (or labor time)

    [134] Sraffa's analysis starts from a `photograph' of an economic system at a given moment in time in order to investigate the effect of hypothetical changes in distinction on relative prices. There is no implied judgement on the specific factors that might determine the technology.

    [137. Marx's theory of price, in Capital III, ch.9] the prices of production of commodities are calculated by adding profit (at the average prevailing in the system) to the values and not to the prices of capital advanced. Furthermore, the average rate of profits is also calculated as a ratio of magnitudes expressed in values (surplus-value and constant and variable capital advanced in value) and not in prices. This contradiction was quickly pointed out and, although it is often denied, it was even explicitly noted by Marx himself [see, Capital III, ch.9, p. 159]

    [143] It can thus be concluded that Sraffa's system of prices of production cannot provide a substitute for Marx's theory of labour-values at least in the sense that Marx meant the theory to be used. Sraffa's system, however, can and should be substituted for Marx's methods of price determination which is not correct as it stands.

    BibTeX:
    @book{roncaglia:78,
      author = {Alessandro Roncaglia},
      title = {Sraffa and the Theory of Prices},
      publisher = {John},
      year = {1978}
    }
    
    Rosenberg, A. The metaphysics of microeconomics 2001 The Economic World View: Studies in the Ontology of Economics, pp. 174-188  incollection  
    BibTeX:
    @incollection{rosenberg01,
      author = {Alex Rosenberg},
      title = {The metaphysics of microeconomics},
      booktitle = {The Economic World View: Studies in the Ontology of Economics},
      publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
      year = {2001},
      pages = {174-188}
    }
    
    Samuels, W.J. & Medema, S.G. Gardiner C. Means: Institutionalist and Post Keynesian 1990   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{samuels-medema90,
      author = {Warren J. Samuels and Steven G. Medema},
      title = {Gardiner C. Means: Institutionalist and Post Keynesian},
      publisher = {M.E. Sharpe},
      year = {1990}
    }
    
    Sawyer, M.C. Kalecki's Microfoundations: The Development of Kalecki's Analysis of Pricing and Distribution, by Peter Kriesler 1998 The Economic Journal
    Vol. 98(389)Kalecki's Microanalysis: The Development of Kalecki's Analysis of Pricing and Distribution, pp. 216-218 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{sawyer88,
      author = {Malcolm C. Sawyer},
      title = {Kalecki's Microfoundations: The Development of Kalecki's Analysis of Pricing and Distribution, by Peter Kriesler},
      booktitle = {Kalecki's Microanalysis: The Development of Kalecki's Analysis of Pricing and Distribution},
      journal = {The Economic Journal},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {98},
      number = {389},
      pages = {216-218}
    }
    
    Sawyer, M.C. Kalecki's Microfoundations: The Development of Kalecki's Analysis of Pricing and Distribution, by Peter Kriesler 1998 The Economic Journal
    Vol. 98(389)Kalecki's Microanalysis: The Development of Kalecki's Analysis of Pricing and Distribution, pp. 216-218 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{sawyer88,
      author = {Malcolm C. Sawyer},
      title = {Kalecki's Microfoundations: The Development of Kalecki's Analysis of Pricing and Distribution, by Peter Kriesler},
      booktitle = {Kalecki's Microanalysis: The Development of Kalecki's Analysis of Pricing and Distribution},
      journal = {The Economic Journal},
      year = {1998},
      volume = {98},
      number = {389},
      pages = {216-218}
    }
    
    Sawyer, M.C. The Economics of Michał Kalecki 1985   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{sawyer:85,
      author = {Malcolm C. Sawyer},
      title = {The Economics of Michał Kalecki},
      publisher = {M.E. Sharpe},
      year = {1985}
    }
    
    Sawyer, M.C. Business Pricing and Inflation 1983   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{sawyer83,
      author = {Sawyer, Malcolm C.},
      title = {Business Pricing and Inflation},
      publisher = {Macmillan Press},
      year = {1983}
    }
    
    Setterfield, M. A note on mark-up pricing and the distribution of income 1996 Review of Political Econonmy
    Vol. 8(1), pp. 79-85 
    article  
    BibTeX:
    @article{setterfield96,
      author = {Mark Setterfield},
      title = {A note on mark-up pricing and the distribution of income},
      journal = {Review of Political Econonmy},
      year = {1996},
      volume = {8},
      number = {1},
      pages = {79-85}
    }
    
    Shapiro, N. The ``Megacorp": Eichner's Contribution to the Theory of Firm 1992 The Megacorp & Macrodynamics, pp. 19-25  incollection  
    Review: A brief, good, summary of Eichner's theory of business enterprise. In essence, the theory entails evolutionary (dynamic), managerial, behavioral, and social chracteristics. This is what Eichner and also myself mean by Realist theory
    BibTeX:
    @incollection{shapiro92,
      author = {Nina Shapiro},
      title = {The ``Megacorp": Eichner's Contribution to the Theory of Firm},
      booktitle = {The Megacorp & Macrodynamics},
      publisher = {M.E. Sharpe},
      year = {1992},
      pages = {19-25}
    }
    
    Sivramkrishna, S. Towards a Post-Autistic Managerial Economics 2003 Post-Autistic Economics Review
    Vol. 20 
    article URL 
    Review: ``there is no need to restrict course contents to neoclassical theory and one should include a wider understanding of economies and economics''.
    BibTeX:
    @article{sivramkrishna03,
      author = {Sashi Sivramkrishna},
      title = {Towards a Post-Autistic Managerial Economics},
      journal = {Post-Autistic Economics Review},
      year = {2003},
      volume = {20},
      url = {http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue20/Sivramkrishna20.htm}
    }
    
    Soederberg, S. Corporate Power and Ownership in Contemporary Capitalism: The Politics of Resistance and Domination 2010   book  
    Review: The corporate governance doctrine.
    Wall Street Rule

    Marxist Perspective:
    ``material basis of human agency and how the latter shapes, and in turn influenced by, the processes and internal contradictions, frequently erupting as crises, in the accumulation of captial'' (harvey 20010)

    [13] 4 premises: 1) the corporation is a social relation of capitalism: embodying class and state relations -- representing underlying contradictions that definecapitalist development, 2) the credit system representing the link between corporations and capital accumulation,

    [15] the state, like the corporation is neither an instrument of class rule nor an autonomous actor, but instead represents a complex and highly contradictory social relations (Holloway and Picciottio 1991)

    [16] Mainstream understanding of the state: legislative, executive, and judicaial functions --- the state in HT: coercive, ideological feature representing dominant groups, helping the reproduciton of the the state quo, ``promotion of the corporate govenance doctrine'' (Gramsci 1992, Prions Notebooks).

    [16] The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002): reproduces the existing relations of power within corporations and the financial system.

    [23] Bush II: Tax free retirement accounts for lower-income working class individuals. + existing private accounts + government matching funds :

    [23] The ownership society is a fully privatized society. Believing the empowerment of individuals.

    [23-4] Mass investment culture in the US.

    [25] Social security capital. The Social reproduction of neoliberalism. "the powerful class interests in the American state are seeking to depoliticize and naturalize social security capital by reducing it to a question of individual responsibility through market interactions'' "economic opportunism, `choice', and `freedom' have replaced social rifhts and public safety nets in the ideology of the Ownership Society''. "declass (and `white-wash) US soceity'

    [30] the Social Security Act (1935): appease class tensions. "like all welfare programmes, social security is not only about meeting a need it is also about controlling behavior, or more to the point, desciplining the labor market (Dean 1990, Moody 1988, Minns 2001, Pollin 2003)

    [31] crisis-led forms of capitalis accumulation

    [33-34] financing social security by leving taxes on wealthy individuals, financial institutions and corporations...the government has chosen to continue to subsidize `rational' market forces through negative corporation taxation rates, `off-shoring' and unwillingness to implement inheritance and wealth taxes. --see Dalery 2009: too high profit rates are the problem.

    [37] Americans are encourated to view themselves as `capitalists' as opposed to unskilled and skilled workers.

    [37] the community of money, which underlies both the Ownership Society and its closely related construct of `Main Street', aims to naturalize, and thus reproduce, not only a classless vision of US society, but also a (blind) faith in the market as the ultimate and fair provider of social welfare.

    [38] the scaled-back welfare system

    [42] The US government move to axe social welfare at both the fedral and state levels has sought to bolster `corporate welfare' through the reduction of corporate income tax.

    [44] workers' future lifestyles depends on the profitability of corporate America

    [45] The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002): the Public Company Accouting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002

    [47] the mainstream corp governance theory ...explain away the recent scandals in myopic, techinical depoliticizing the struggles and underlying contradictions rooted in neolberal-led restructuring of capital accumulation.

    [50] SOX: principle of self-regulatin -- laissez-faire line. ineffective. still many corporate abuse fraud, misinterpretations of financial data.

    [51] CG in the context of reproduction of neo-liberalism: agent-principal model: connotate neutral and objective relations. BAsed upon indivudal rationality.

    [51] Gramsci's Hegemony: "common sense" [Veblen's institution]

    [53] ``Wall Street Walk" : shareholder selling shares when they are unsatisfied with management -- based upon the efficient market hypo. (see Fama 1970s)

    [53] The assumption underlying SOX: the state is a neutral terrain that is a separate entity from the economy (Lockean view)

    [59] The theory of the state: Marxsits: the state -- a historical form of capitalist social relations the state's existence depends on the reproduciton of those relations. See Hollaway 1995. Capital and the National State in

    [60] the law is not an objective, neutral force, but reflects the powe relations within capitalist society.

    [60] As in the case of SOX, US Congress grants the SEC power to implement relatively tough regulatiory measures in the interactions of promoting good corporate governance practices...the SEC is empowered to regulate indirectly the behaviour of corporations through disclosure lasws and listing requirements. However, the SEC has never exercisesd these power and has opted for non-intervention''

    BibTeX:
    @book{soederberg10,
      author = {Susanne Soederberg},
      title = {Corporate Power and Ownership in Contemporary Capitalism: The Politics of Resistance and Domination},
      publisher = {Routledge},
      year = {2010}
    }
    
    Sraffa, P. Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities 1960   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{sraffa60,
      author = {Sraffa, Piero},
      title = {Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities},
      publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
      year = {1960}
    }
    
    Sraffa, P. The Laws of Returns under Competitive Conditions 1926 The Economic Journal
    Vol. 36(144), pp. 535-550 
    article  
    Review: ``the imposing structure of diminishing returns is available only for the study of that minute class of commodities in the production of which the whole of afactor of production is employed" (539) ``Business men, who regard themselves as being subject to competitive conditions, would consider absurd the assertion that the limit to their production is to be found in the internal conditions of production in their firm, which do not permit of the production of a greater quantity without an increase in cost. The chief obstacle against which they have to content when they want gradually to increase their production does not lie in the cost of production -- which, indeed, generally favoours them in that direction -- but in the difficulty of selling the larger quantity of goods without reducing the price, or without having to face increased marketing expenses" (543)
    BibTeX:
    @article{sraffa26,
      author = {Piero Sraffa},
      title = {The Laws of Returns under Competitive Conditions},
      journal = {The Economic Journal},
      year = {1926},
      volume = {36},
      number = {144},
      pages = {535-550},
      note = {Well written english - concise and words}
    }
    
    Steindl, J. Maturity and Stagnation in American Capitalism 1952   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{steindl52,
      author = {Josef Steindl},
      title = {Maturity and Stagnation in American Capitalism},
      publisher = {Basil Blackwell},
      year = {1952},
      edition = {Second}
    }
    
    Todorova, Z. Money and Households in a Capitalist Economy: A Gendered Post Keynesian--Institutional Analysis 2009   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{todorova09,
      author = {Zdravka Todorova},
      title = {Money and Households in a Capitalist Economy: A Gendered Post Keynesian--Institutional Analysis},
      publisher = {Edward Elgar},
      year = {2009}
    }
    
    Toporowski, J. Methodology and Microeconomics in the Early Work of Hyman P. Minsky 2006 (480.)  techreport  
    Review: Minsky appears to reject Schumpeter's view in Business Cycles that the business cycle is either a purely statistical phenomenon, a la Slutsky, or else is cause by industrial innovation (Schumpeter 1939) (p. 2)

    ``a theory of busines cycles, to be consistent with the observable material and the inherited doctrines, should be a blen of the analytical material which deal with the appraoch of monetary theory---and the analytical material which deals with the behavior of individual economic units and of particualr markets---which has been sphere of price and distribution theory'' (Minsky 2004 [1954], p.#)

    ``Inherent in the nature of the business cycle is the statement that the relevant parameters for the firm's behavior do not remain the same over the cycle. ... an effort must be made to see whether the theory of the firm and the theory of fianncial and monetary behavior will lead to a selection of the nature of the non-linearity of the accelerator generating relation'' (Minsky 2004)

    Minsky's microeconomci concern (that is Minsky's microfoundation): balance sheet approach --- Minsky's theory of the firm -- the core of the instability hypothesis. The firm as ``a balance sheet of assets and libabilities, as opposed to the notion of the firm as an entrepreneur making production decisions, that is the foundation of textbook economics of the firm'' (8) --- see Crotty's critiques: for M, maangement and owners are identical.

    For Minsky, market structure --- market process --- individual firm's investment behavior that is reflected in the firm's balance sheet. (5)

    Minsky rejected Robinson/Chamberlin's monopolistic competetion theory in the sense that profit-maximization is assumed if the market is competitive. (5-6)

    Toporowski argues that Minsky's adopted Kalecki's theory of profit. But it is inconsistent with Minsky's Keynesian/Marshallian monetary analysis. Minsky did not pay attention to this. The Keynesian/Marshallian theory assumes a representative firm. Kalecki's theory assumes differing degrees of monopoly which influece largely on individual firm's behavior.

    ``it is the net indebtedness of individual firms that is the critical indicator of fragility, not the growss indebtedness of the company sector as a whole, as Minsky was to argue'' (15)

    BibTeX:
    @techreport{toporowski06,
      author = {Jan Toporowski},
      title = {Methodology and Microeconomics in the Early Work of Hyman P. Minsky},
      year = {2006},
      number = {480.}
    }
    
    Trigg, A.B. Quantity and Price Systems: Toward a Framework for Coherence between Post-Keynesians and Sraffian Economics 2008 Future Directions for Heterodox Economics, pp. 127-141  incollection  
    Review: Price quantity model derived directly from the IO matrix. Arguing that both Kaleckian and Sraffian economics can be integrated throgh the price-quantity model. Consistent with Lee and Jo.
    BibTeX:
    @incollection{trigg08,
      author = {Andrew B. Trigg},
      title = {Quantity and Price Systems: Toward a Framework for Coherence between Post-Keynesians and Sraffian Economics},
      booktitle = {Future Directions for Heterodox Economics},
      publisher = {The University of Michigan Press},
      year = {2008},
      pages = {127-141}
    }
    
    Varoufakis, Y. Capitalism According to Evolutionary Game Theory: The Impossibility of a Sufficiently Evolutionary Model of Historical Change 2008 Science & Society
    Vol. 72(1), pp. 63-94 
    article  
    Abstract: Evolutionary game theory has recenty furnished some exciting theoretical and experimental insights regarding the birth of social power and discrimination. But can this type of theoyr illuminate the history and nature of capitalism? The answer turns out to be negative: evolutionary models are bound to remain either insufficiently evolutionary or hopelessly indeterminate. However, social theorists have much to gain from understanding what would breathe social life into evolutionary game theory's models: a proper historial account of the sources of behavioral variety, and and adaptive mechanism that leaves room for the cunning of human reasons.
    Review: Marx habitually, and rightly, poured scorn on those (e.g.. Spinoza and Feurbach) who transplanted models from the natural to the social sciences with little or no modification to allow for the fact that human beings are ontologically different from atoms, molecules, genes and planets. (65-66) while the logic of evolution is indispensable, it is also insufficient: that evolutionary models are good at explaning variational change (i.e., selection within a paradigm, e.g., the rise of consumerism after World War II) but find it hard to inform transformational change (i.e., the emergence of a new paradigm such as, e.g., capitalism). (66) The EvGT can provide an interesting narrative on the emergence of social power and ideology in hunter-gatherer societies, thus, not in dispute. The question is whether it has a sophisticated story to tell about societies with collective production, ranging from the agrarian to the capitalist. (80) 3 Criticisms of EvGT: 1. evolutionary theory, it it is to offer determinate models, can only portrary the generation of variety in a manner that must be too restrictive to allow for genuine historical change. (86) ...the evolutionary aproach loses all analytical power the moment it allows humans to do what they have been doing throughout history. (87) Modeling mutations as random events may be admissible in biological theories of, e.g., the evolution of genes. However, when it comes to human societies, the mechanism generating social and political anti-establishment behavior cannot be treated as statistically independent of the mechanism that alters our character, capacities and social relations. (87-8) 2. although the evolutionary approach may have on offer various intriguing narratives on how social conentions reflect the jointly evolving technologies and relations of produciton, all such narratives are condemned to be innocent of a critical aspect of capitalist social dynamics: the inevitable, collective, poitical resistance of those who are, systematically, at the sharp end of extrative power. (89) Evolutionary theory, consequently, faces a dilemma between: a) to abandon the cause of elucidating history in general and capitalism in particular, sticking instead to deerminate models where variety is generated by random, apolitical, mutations; or b) to espouse history, by ditching its penchant for modeling exercises. (89) 3. evolutionism cannot furnish a critique of evolved institutions useful either to the historian or the active citizen. (90)
    BibTeX:
    @article{varoufakis08,
      author = {Yanis Varoufakis},
      title = {Capitalism According to Evolutionary Game Theory: The Impossibility of a Sufficiently Evolutionary Model of Historical Change},
      journal = {Science & Society},
      year = {2008},
      volume = {72},
      number = {1},
      pages = {63-94}
    }
    
    Veblen, T.B. The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions 1973   book  
    Review: Ch. 2 In the sequence of cultural evoluton the emergence of a leisure class coincides with the beginning of ownership. (22) The motive that lies at the root of ownership is emulation; and the same motive of emulation continues active in the further development of the institution to which it has given rise and the development of all those features of the social structure which this institution of ownership touches. (25-26) Wealth is now itself intrinsically honourable and confers honour on its possessor. (29) the end sought by accumulation [of wealth] is to rank high in comparison with the rest of the community in point of pecuniary strength. (31) [individual vs. aggregate] If, as is sometimes assumed, the incentive to accumulation were the want of subsistence or of physical comfort, then the aggregate economic wants of a community might conceivably be satisfied at some point in the advance of industrial efficiency; but since the struggle is substantially a race for reputability on the basis of an invidious comparison, no approach to a definitive attainment is possible. (32) To a great extent this emulation shapes the methods and selects the objects of expenditure for personal comfort and decent livelihood. (32) [Power] the power conferred by wealth also affords a motive to accumulation. (32-33) Under the régime of individual ownership the most available means of visibly achieving a purpose is that afforded by the acquisition and accumulation of goods; and as the self-regarding antithesis between man and man reaches fuller consciousness, the propensity for achievement --- the instinct of workmanship --- thends more and more to shape itself into a straining to excel others in pecuniary achievement. Relative success, tested by an invidious pecuniary comparison with other men, becomes the conventional end of action. (33)
    BibTeX:
    @book{veblen1899,
      author = {Veblen, Thorstein B.},
      title = {The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions},
      publisher = {Houghton Mifflin Company},
      year = {1973},
      note = {Originally published in 1899.}
    }
    
    Veblen, T.B. Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times: The Case of America 1964   book  
    Review: "In the long run, of course, the pressure of changing material circumstances will have to shape the lines of human conduct, on pain of extinction...But it does not follow that the pressure of material necessity, visibly enforeced by the dealth penalty, will ensure such a change in the legal and moral punctilios as will save the nation from the death penalty'' (17)
    BibTeX:
    @book{veblen23,
      author = {Thorstein B. Veblen},
      title = {Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times: The Case of America},
      publisher = {Sentry Press},
      year = {1964},
      note = {Originally published in 1923}
    }
    
    Veblen, T.B. The Engineers and the Price System 1921   book  
    Review: I. Sabotage

    [7] It should not be difficult to show taht the common welfare in any commnity which is organized on the price system cannot be maintained without a salutary use of sabotage---that is to say, such habitual recourse to delay and obstruction of industry and such restriction of output as will maintain prices at a reasonably profitable level and so guard against business depression.

    [8] A businesslike control of the rate and volume of output is indispensable for keeping up a profitable market, and ad profitable market is the first and unremitting conditon of prosperity in any community whole industry is owned and managed by business men.

    [17] Business enterprise being the palladium of the Republic, it is right to take any necessary measures for its safeguarding. Price is of the essense of the case, whereas livelihood is not.

    [18-9] Where the national government is charged with teh general care of the country's business interests, as is invariably the case among the civilized nations, it follows from the nature of the case that the nation's lawgivers and administration will have some share in administering that necessary modicum of sabotage that must always go into the day's work of carryign on inudstry by business methods and for business purposes.

    [22] In what has just been said their is, of course, no intention to find fault with any of these uses of sabotage. It is not a question of morals and good intentions. It is alwyas to be presuemd as a matte of course that the guiding spirit in all such governmental moves to regularize the nation's affairs, whether by restraint or by incitement, is a wise soclicitude fo rhte nation's enduring gain and security. All that can be said here is that many of these wise measures of restraint and incitement are in the nature of sabotage, and that in effect they habitually, though not invariably, inure to the benefit of certain vested interests---ordinarily vested interests which bulk large in the ownership and control of the nation's resources.

    II. The Industral System and the Capitains of Industry

    [27-29] Three factors of production (Land, Labor, and Capital] + Industrial Arts (technology) + Entrepreneurs (who takes care of the financial end of things of big business, e.g. corporate financiers).

    [31] This captains of industry, typified by the corpiration financier, and latterly by the investment banker, is one of the institutions that go to make up the new order of things, which has been coming on among all civilized peoples ever since the Industrial REvolution set in.

    [33] They [captains of industry and entrepreneurs] were a cross between a business man and an industrial expert.

    [38] Corporate organization has continually gone forward to a large scale and a more comprehensive coalition of forces, and at the same time, and more and more visibly, it has become the ordinary duty of the corporate management to adjust production to the requirements of th market by restrciting the output to what the traffic will bear; that is to say, what will yield the largest net earnings. Under corporate management it rarely happens that production is pushed to the limit of capacity.

    [38-39] [Concentraion and Coalition in order to control the level and rates of output and thereby to max profits. In contolling output, sabotage of production often happens and a big business is serviceable for the sake of sabotage]

    [40] [Principles of business administration---price and max profits vs. Principles of industry/technology --- max output]

    [42] [administered price doctine in Veblen's sense] When corporate organization and the consequent control of output came into bearing there were two lines of policy open to the management: (a) to maintain profitable prices by limiting the output, and (b) to maintain profits by lowering the production cost of an increased output. ... the former proved to be more attractive; it involves less risk, and it required less acquaintance with the working processes of industry.

    [45] American corportion finance...the Era of Investment Banker [it means corporate governance and marekt governance, in modern sesne]

    [45-46] US Stree Industry: Coalition; price stabilization + product curtailment.

    [47] Since then this manner of corporation finance has been further perfected and standardized, until it will not hold true that no large move in the field of corporation finance can be made without the advice and consent of those large funded interests that are in a position to act as investment bankers; nor does any large enterprise is corporation business ever escape from the continued control of the investmetn bankers in any of tis larger transactions; nor can any corporate enterprise of the larger sort now continue to do busienss except on terms which will yield something appreciable in the way of income ot the investment bankers, whose continued support is necessayr to its success.

    [49] ...as always corporation finance is a traffic in credit; indeed, now more than ever before. Therefore to stabilize cororate business sufficiently in the hands fo this inclusive quasi-syndicate of banking interests it is necessary that the credit system of the country should as a whole be administered on a unified plan nd inclusively.

    III. The Capitains of Finance and the Engineers

    [52] For all these reasons it [industrial system] lends itself to systematic control under the direction of industrial experts, skilled technolgists, who may be called ``production engineers,'' for want of a better term.

    [54] the industrial system is deliberately handicapped with dissesion, misdirection, and unemployment of material resources, equipment, and man power, at every turn where the statesmen or the captains of finance can touch its mechanism; and all the civilized peoples are suffering privation together because their general staff of industrial experts ar in this way required to take orders and submit to sabotage at the hands of the statesmen and the vested interests. Politics and investment are still allowed to decide matters of industrial policy which should plainly be left to the discretion of the general staff of production engineers driven by no commercial bias.

    [58] this mechanical state of the inudstrial arts will not long tolerate the continued control of production by the vested interests under the current business-like rule of incapacity by advisement.

    [61-2] The result has beenm uniformly and as a matter of course, that the productin of goods and services has advisedly been stopped short of productive capacity, by curtailment of output and by derangement of the productive system. There are two main reasons for this, and both have operated together throughout the machine era to stop industrial production increasingly short of productive capacity. (a) The commercial need of maintaining a profitable price ahs led to an increasingly imperative curtailment of the output, as fast as the advance of the industrial arts has enhanced the productive capacity. And (b) the continued advance of the mechanical technology has called for an ever increasing volume and diversity of speical knowledge, and so has left the businesslike capitains of finance continually farter in arrears, so that they have been less and less capable of cmprehending what is required in the ordinary way of idustrial equipment and personnel.

    BibTeX:
    @book{veblen21,
      author = {Thorstein B. Veblen},
      title = {The Engineers and the Price System},
      publisher = {The Viking Press},
      year = {1921}
    }
    
    Veblen, T.B. The Limitations of Marginal Utility 1909 Journal of Political Economy
    Vol. 17(9), pp. 620-636 
    article  
    Review: ``the [neoclassical] theory is confined to the ground of sufficient reason instead of proceeding on the ground of efficient cause" (veblen 1909). nc:

    ``its attention is confined to this teleological bearing of conduct alone. it deals with this conduct only in so far as it may be construed in rationalistic, teleological terms of calculation and choice" institutions: ``they are settled habits of thought common to the generality of men".

    ``the acceptance by the economists of these or other institutional elements as given and immutable limits their inquiry in a particular and decisive way". "it shut off the inquiry at the point where the modern scientific interest sets in. the institutions in question are no doubt good for their purpose as institutions, but they are not good as premises for a scientific inquiry into the nature, origin, growth, and effects of these institutions and of the mutations which they undergo and whch they bring to pass the community's scheme of life". ``institutions are outgrowth of habit". opposite understanding of institution: (630)

    - neoclassical: a priori-given-immutal-stable-natural
    - evolutionary: causal-vary-changing-unstable-subject to change in response to human conduct.
    habits-institutions-culture: micro and macro synthesis the growth of culture is occuring by means of `habitual response of human nature'. ``evidently an economic inquiry whch occupies itself exclusively with the movements of this consistent, elemental human nautre under given, stable institutional condition--such as is the case with the current hedonistic economics--can reach statical results alone; since it makes abstraction frm those elements that make for anything but a statical result. on the other hand an adequate theory of economic conduct, even for statical purposes, cannot be drawn in terms of the individual simply--as is the case with the marginal-utility economics--because it cannot be drawn in terms of the underlying traits of human nature simply; since the reponse that goes to make up human conduct takes place under institutional norms and only under stimuli that have an institutional bearing; for the situation that provokes and inhibits action in any given case is itself in great part of institutional, cultural derivation. then, too, the phenomena of human life occur only as phenomena of the life of a group or community...the wants and desires, the end and aim, the ways and means, the ammplitude and drift of the individual's conduct are functins of an institutional variable that is of a higher complex and wholly unstable character" (629) ``institutions act to direct and define the aims and end of conduct. it is, of course, on individuals that the system of institutions imposes those conventional standards, ideals, and cannons of conduct that make up the community's scheme of life. scientific inquiry in ths field, therefore, must deal with individual conduct and must formulate its theoretical results in terms of individual conduct" (629) methodology: ``in so faras modern science inquires into the phenomena of life, whether inanimat, brute, or human, it is occupied about questions of genesis and cumulative change, and it converges upon a theoretical formulation in the shape of a life-history drawn in causal terms. in so far as it is a science in the current sense of the term, any science, such as economcis, which has to do with human conduct, becomes a genetic inquiry into the human scheme of life and where, as in economics, the subject of inquiry is the conduct of man in his dealings with the material means of life, the science ins necessarily an inquiry into the life-history of material civilization, on a more or less extended or restricted plan. capitalist system as money economy ``economic institutions in the modern civilized scheme of life are (prevailingly) institutions of the price system" (631)

    BibTeX:
    @article{veblen09,
      author = {Thorstein B. Veblen},
      title = {The Limitations of Marginal Utility},
      journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
      year = {1909},
      volume = {17},
      number = {9},
      pages = {620-636}
    }
    
    Veblen, T.B. The Theory of Business Enterprise 1904   book  
    Review: Machine process and BE:\
    BE is the directing force of the modern industrial system or capitalistic system. ``Its characteristic features, and at the same time the forces by virtue of which it dominates modern culture, are the machine process and investment for a profit" (1)

    ``The machine industry...are in a dominant position; they set the pace for the rest of the industrial system" (2)

    `the rule of investment for profits' -- the business principle: ``those elements in the industrial world that take the initiative and exert a far-reaching coercive guidance in matters of industry go to their work with a view to profits on investment, and are guided by the principles and exigencies of business" (2)

    Business man:
    ``The business man, especially the business man of wide and authoritative discretion, has become a controlling force in industry, because, through the mechanism of investments and markets, he controls the plants and processes, and these set the pace and determine of movement for the rest" (2-3)

    Consequently, ``In so far as the theorist aims to explain the specifically modern economic phenomena, his line of approach must be from the business man's standpoint, since it is from that standpoint that the course of these phenomena is directed. A theory of the modern economic situation must be primarily a theory of business traffic, with its motives, aims, methods, and effects " (Veblen, T.B. 1904: 4).

    II. Machine process

    Standardization: The machine process induces the standardization of production, services, and everyday human life. ``As a result of this superinduced mechanical regularity of life, the livelihood of individuals is, over large areas, affected in an approximately uniform manner by any incident which at all seriously affects the industrial process at any point" (14-15)

    Social relations, business principle, and the BE:
    ``It is by business transactions that the balance of working relations between the several industrial units is maintained or restored, adjusted and readjusted, and it is on the same basis and by the same method that the affairs of each industrial unit are regulated. The relations in which any independent industrial concern stands to its employees, as well as to other concerns, are always reducible to pecuniary terms. It is at this point that the business man comes into the industrial process as a decisive factor.

    III. Business Enterprise

    ``The motive of business is pecuniary gain, the method is essentially purchase and sale. The aim and usual outcome is an accumulation of wealth" (20)

    Business relations bridge individual BE with industry: \br>``The channel by which disturbances are transmitted from member to member of the comprehensive industrial system is the business relations between the several members of the system; and, under the modern conditions of ownership, disturbances, favorable or unfavorable, in the field of industry are transmitted by nothing but these business relations" (26) ...``The adjustment of industry take place through the mediation of pecuniary transactions, and these transactions take place at the hands of the business ends, not for industrial ends in the narrower meaning of the phrase" (27).

    Captains of Industry and Power: ``This large business strategy is the most admirable trait of the great business men who with force and insight swing the fortunes of civilized mankind.... The captain's strategy is commonly directed to gaining control of some large portion of the industrial system. When such control has been achieved, it may be to his interest to make and maintain business conditions which shall facilitate the smooth and efficient working of what has come under his control, in case he continues to hold a large interest in it as an investor; for, other things equal, the gains from what has come under his hands permanently in the way of industrial plant are greater the higher and more uninterrupted its industrial efficiency" (30) ``The ulterior end sought is an increase of ownership, not industrial serviceability" (37). ``His aim is to contrive a consolidation in which he will be at an advantage, and to effect it on the terms most favorable to his own interest" (37).

    Business man as an organizer of comprehensive industrial process. (35)

    ``The industrial system is organized on business principles and for pecuniary ends. The business man is at the centre: he holds the discretion and he exercises it freely, and his choice falls out now on one side, now on the other. The retardation as well as the advance is to be set down to his account" (45).

    Monetary production economy: Veblen borrows Marx's idea of monetary circuit and argues that ``The vital point of production with him is the vendibility of the output, its convertibility into money values, not its serviceability for the needs of mankind" (51).

    Monopoly\br>``The broad principle which guides producers and merchants, large and small, in fixing the prices at which they offer their wares and services is what is known in the language of the railroads as ``charging what the traffic will bear." Where a given enterprise has a strict monopoly of the supply of a given article or of a given class of services this principle applies in the unqualified form in which it has been understood among those who discuss railway charges. But where monopoly is less strict, where there are competitors, there the competition that has to be met is one of the factors to be taken account of in determining what the traffic will bear; competition may even become the most serious factor in the case if the enterprise in question has little or none of the character of a monopoly. But it is very doubtful if there are any successful business ventures within the range of the modern industries from which the monopoly element is wholly absent. They are, at any rate, few an not of great magnitude. And the endeavor of all such enterprises that look to a permanent continuance of their business is to establish as much of a monopoly as may be. Such a monopoly position may be a legally established one, or one due to location or the control of natural resources, or it may be a monopoly of a less definite character resting on custom and prestige (good-will)... The end sought by the systematic advertising of the larger business concerns is such a monopoly of custom and prestige. (53-55).

    Consequences of the dominance of business principle\br>``The outcome of this recital, then, is that wherever and in so far as business ends and methods dominate modern industry the relation between the usefulness of the work (for other purposes than pecuniary gain) and the remuneration of it is remote and uncertain to such a degree that no attempt at formulating such a relation is worthwhile." (63)

    IV. Business Principles

    Summary: causes and effects -- from the physical to the metaphysical \br>Machine process --- industrial society --- Ownership --- Business principle / Pecuniary principle

    ``The discipline of the machine process enforces a standardization of conduct and of knowledge in terms of quantitative precision, and inculcates a habit of apprehending an explaining facts in terms of material cause and effect. It involves a valuation of facts, things, relations, and even personal capacity, in terms of forces." (66-67) ``Its metaphysics is materialism and its point of view is that of causal sequence." (67). ``The habit of mind prevails most widely and with least faltering in those communities that have achieved great things in the machine industry, being both a cause and an effect of the machine process" (67)

    On Money (82-85): \p>``The business man judges of events from the standpoint of ownership, and ownership runs in terms of money.

    On Investment\br>``Investments are made for profit, and industrial plants and processes are capitalized on the basis of their profit-yielding capacity" (85)

    On Profit and interest (-91)\br>Veblen's `ordinary rate of profits' is a widely accepted rate by entrepreneurs in money terms. It is not the `uniform rate of profit'' determined by competition in real terms. Profits determine the rate of interest.

    V. The Use of Loan Credit

    Positive relation between Market power and Credit advantage

    ``[T]he competitive earning capacity of business enterprises comes currently to rest on the basis, not of the initial capital alone, but of capital plus such borrowed funds as this capital will support" (97).

    On Financing \br>``[A]part from such incidental shifting of the management of industry to more competent (or less competent) hands, this competitive use of borrowed funds has no aggregate effect upon earnings or upon the industrial output" (98)

    Here Veblen argues that external financing has no significant effect on the real economic activity. His rationale is that under the competitive setting credit is only a competitive advantage. ``they [business capital] swell the volume of business as counted in terms of price, etc., but they do not directly swell the volume of industry, since they do not add to the aggregate material apparatus of industry, or later the character of the processes employed, or enhance the degree of efficiency with which industry is managed." (99). ``[sic] apart from this psychological effect the expansion of business capital through credit extension has no aggregate industrial effect" (100).

    Supporting arguments that ``borrowed funds do not increase the aggregate industrial equipment" are: a) the loans are not fully covered by property which is not already otherwise engaged, b) the use of borrowed funds would not increase the technical (material) outfit of industry. (101)

    After this Veblen's argument sounds like QTM. Nmmus nummum non parit-- Money does not make money.

    See page 112 for the summary of Loan Credit.\
    (Jo) Veblenian Dichotomy: The underlying conviction around Loan Credit is that industry makes and produces real/serviceable materials. But financial institutions make money which is not serviceable. Thus credit does not generate serviceability. Rather it reduces serviceability.

    VI. Modern Business Capital

    Veblen's q: \br>``The effective (business) capitalization, as distinct from the de jure capitalization, is not fixed permanently and inflexibly by a past act of incorporation or stock issue. It is fixed for the time being only, by an ever recurring valuation of the company's properties, tangible and intangible, on the basis of their earning-capacity" (138)

    Micro vs. Macro or Individual vs. community\br>````All these items [good-will; established customary business relations, reputation , franchises, privileges, trade-mark, brands, patent rights, copyrights, etc] give a different advantage to their owners, but they are of no aggregate advantage to the community. They are wealth to the individuals concerned--differential wealth; but they make no part of the wealth of nations." (140)

    The reason for dealing with Corporation:\br>``The corporation is, of course, not the only form of business concern in the industrial field, but it is the typical, characteristic form of business organization for the management of industry in modern times, and the peculiarities of modern capital are therefore best seen in these modern corporations." (140)

    Psychological factors\br>``The market fluctuations in the amount of capital proceed on variation of confidence on the part of the investors, on current belief as to the probable policy or tactics of the business men in control, on forecasts as to the seasons and the tactics of the guild of politicians, and on the indeterminable, largely instinctive, shifting movements of public sentiment and apprehension. So that under modern conditions the magnitude of the business capital and its mutations from day to day are in great measure a question of folk psychology" (149)

    On uncertainty\br>``...putative earning-capacity is the outcome of many surmises with respect to prospective earning and the like; and these surmises will vary from on man to the next, since they proceed on an imperfect, largely conjectural, knowledge of present earning-capacity and on the still more imperfectly known future course of the goods market and of corporate policy." (155-156)

    On asymmetric information\br>``Hence sales of securities are frequent, both because outsiders vary in their estimates and forecasts, and because the information of the outsiders does not coincide with that of the insiders[sic] Partial information, as well as misinformation, sagaciously given out at a critical juncture, will go far toward producing a favorable temporary discrepancy of this kind, and so enabling the managers to buy or sell the securities of the concern with advantage to themselves." (156-157)

    Stratified interests of managers, corporations, and the public\br>``[T]he interest of the managers of a modern corporation need not coincide with the permanent interest of the corporation as a going concern; neither does it coincide with the interest which the community at large has in the efficient management of the concern as an industrial enterprise." (157)

    By this stratified interest Veblen argues the managed-industrial society\br>``It is the interest of the community at large that the enterprise should be so managed as to give the best and largest possible output of goods or services; whereas the interest of the corporation as a going concern is that it be managed with a view to maintaining its efficiency and selling as large an output as may be at the best prices obtainable in the long run; but the interest of the managers, and of the owners for the time being, is to so manage the enterprise as to enable them to buy it up or to sell out as expeditiously and as advantageously as may be. The interest of the community at large demands industrial efficiency and serviceability of the product; while the business interest of the concern as such demand vendibility of the product; and the interest of those men who have the final discretion in the management of these corporate enterprises demands vendibility of the corporate capital." (157-158)

    Money economy Vs. Credit Economy (158-159)\br>In the credit economy industry--business--community are separated. The ownership and management are separated as well. Corporation is the typical form and the capital market is the dominant market over product market. Such a Veblen's description of the credit economy is quite similar to the Eichner's description of advanced capitalist economy which is the basis of the Eichener's theory.

    In summary, the emergence of the credit economy results in following aspects: ``the fortunes of property owners are in large measure dependent on the discretion of others--the owners of intangible property; and the management of the industrial equipment tends strongly to centre in the hands of men who do not own the industrial equipment, and who have only a remote interest in the efficient working of this equipment. The property of those who own less, or who own only material goods, is administered by those who own more, especially of immaterial goods; and the material processes of industry are under the control of men whose interest centres on an increased value of the immaterial assets." (175-176).

    BibTeX:
    @book{veblen04,
      author = {Thorstein B. Veblen},
      title = {The Theory of Business Enterprise},
      publisher = {Charles Scribner's Sons},
      year = {1904}
    }
    
    Villena, M.G. & Villena, M.J. Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen's Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian? 2004 Journal of Economic Issues
    Vol. XXXVIII(3), pp. 585-610 
    article  
    Review: The article argues that ``EGT is indeed consistent with Veblen's proposals and thus may be considered to be Veblenian evolutionary approach" (605). Linking EGT and Veblen. Wrong understanding of Veblen. the link between EGT and Veblen is not the way to go for Veblenians and institutionalist, but it may be useful for EGT and other nc game theorists to embrace Veblen's approach (but it is unlikely). The existence of fundamental difference between the two at the ontological and epistemological levels leads to its own use of methods--descriptive and formal. The former is no less insightful or powerful in exaplaining the social reality -- this is the power of Veblen's evolutionary economics. Even authors are supportive of nc dynamic game theory, anthropologic game theory (a la Bowles and Gintis and San Ta fe). It is a disleading direction of institutional evolutionary research program. By the same token, the criticisms can be applied to Neo-Schumpeterian (Nelson and Winter), complex systemsand meso approach (Foster, Potts, Dopfer) Authors' understanding of Veblen: from a Darwinian biology, the principle of survival of fittest (which Veblen rejects), history, non-equilibrium, non-teleology, open, uncertainty, cumulative causation, path-dependent; 1) institutions as the basic unit of analysis, 2) institutional-cultural context, 3) non-optimizing behavior, 4) Institutional intertia and conflict, 5) evolution of institutions EGT has problems and limitations such as Alexander McKenzie (2002)'s argument that EGT may be irrelvant since ``we rarely need an evolutionary game theoretic model to identify a particular social phenomenon as stable or persistent as that can be done by observation of present conditions and examination of the historical records" (cited in 606) Authors' view on theory: ``reality is never so simple that one can always easily observe the stability or persistence of complex social phenomena and hence conclude what the relevant variables involved are. In addition to clarifying some of these not so obvious points, gae theoretica explanations can also be useful to formalize ``the obvious and evident", thus providing a stricter and clearer explanation of the stability of the particular situation being analyzed" (606) In this regard, I would argue that descriptive-interdisciplinary-qualitative analysis is no less clearer--it is matter of the way of reasoning and understanding the reality. Authors seem to think that formal models are only rigorous and scientific. That is postivist way, not of Veblen and Institutionalists. [Jo] Duality, stability, retention, of institution Vs. Instable and conflict of institutions: >> [Jo] Then what is the source of (in)stability? Veblen--agency, EGT--rule (of game), Neo-Schumpeterian--disconnection of network (of rules) On formal modeling or theory - in the Veblenian framwork there is place for formal theory, as that that could be provided by evolutionayr game theory, but the analysis of the historical context should not be limited to highly abstract formal models (see Rutherford 1994: 11, and 1998)
    BibTeX:
    @article{villena04,
      author = {Mauricio G. Villena and Marcelo J. Villena},
      title = {Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen's Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian?},
      journal = {Journal of Economic Issues},
      year = {2004},
      volume = {XXXVIII},
      number = {3},
      pages = {585-610}
    }
    
    Introducing Microeconomic Analysis: Issues, Questions, and Competing Views 2010   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{bougrine:10,,
      title = {Introducing Microeconomic Analysis: Issues, Questions, and Competing Views},
      publisher = {Edmond Montgomery Publications},
      year = {2010}
    }
    
    Introducing Microeconomic Analysis: Issues, Questions, and Competing Views 2010   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{bougrine:10,,
      title = {Introducing Microeconomic Analysis: Issues, Questions, and Competing Views},
      publisher = {Edmond Montgomery Publications},
      year = {2010}
    }
    
    A Guide to Post-Keynesian Economics 1979   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{eichner79,,
      title = {A Guide to Post-Keynesian Economics},
      publisher = {M.E. Sharpe},
      year = {1979}
    }
    
    Intersubjectivity in Economics 2002   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{fullbrook:02,,
      title = {Intersubjectivity in Economics},
      publisher = {Routledge},
      year = {2002}
    }
    
    The Heterodox Economics of Gardiner C. Means: A Collection 1992   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{lee-samuels:92,,
      title = {The Heterodox Economics of Gardiner C. Means: A Collection},
      publisher = {M.E. Sharpe},
      year = {1992}
    }
    
    The Megacorp and Macrodynamics: Essays in Memory of Alfred Eichner 1992   book  
    BibTeX:
    @book{milberg92,,
      title = {The Megacorp and Macrodynamics: Essays in Memory of Alfred Eichner},
      publisher = {M.E. Sharpe},
      year = {1992}
    }
    

    Created by JabRef on 14/02/2011.